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ABSTRACT 
 
TURKEY’S POTENTIAL AS AN ENERGY HUB: TO WHAT EXTENT CAN IT 
FULFILL ITS POTENTIAL AS A PROVIDER OF ENERGY SECURITY FOR 
EUROPE? 
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Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Emre Hatipoğlu 
 
Keywords: EU energy security, gas market, energy hub, diversification, energy 
corridor, dependency 
 
With increasing geostrategic uncertainties for Eurasia, the EU’s energy security has 
become an increasingly pressing concern, and the question has arisen whether countries 
positioned as energy “bridges” or “corridors,” i.e. over which the greater volume of gas 
is transported, such as Turkey, can advance to a role of regional energy trading hubs to 
offset threats and develop further advantage by making available spare capacity for 
trade and emergencies. This thesis will examine Turkey’s potential for advancing its 
status to that of an energy trading hub by examining major oil and gas pipelines, storage 
capacities, legal and regulatory frameworks, the long-term and spot pricing mechanism 
and the prospects for LNG in meeting future demand. The projected likelihood of 
Turkey being able to take on spare capacity is examined with reference to availability 
from regional energy exporters. Turkey’s shortcomings in meeting the prerequisites for 
becoming a hub are discussed and recommendations made for how this can be achieved. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN ENERJİ MERKEZİ OLMA POTANSİYELİ: AVRUPA ENERJİ 
GÜVENLİĞİNE POTANSİYEL ENERJİ TEDARİKÇİSİ OLARAK NE 
DERECEDE KATKIDA BULUNABİLİR? 
 
ERSİN MERDAN 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez 2016 
Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Emre Hatipoğlu 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: AB enerji güvenliği, doğal gaz piyasası, enerji merkezi, çeşitlilik, 
enerji koridoru, bağımlılık 
 
Avrasya’da artan jeo-stratejik belirsizlikler nedeniyle Avrupa enerji güvenliği giderek 
artan bir endişe konusu haline gelmiştir. Bu çerçevede enerji koridoru ya da enerji 
köprüsü olma rolünde olan Türkiye gibi ülkelerin,  potansiyel tehlike ve acil durumlarda 
kullanıma açık ek kapasite yaratılması yoluyla bölgesel enerji ticaret merkezi olma 
rolüne geçip geçmeyecekleri sorusu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca bu tezde Türkiye’nin 
enerji merkezi olma statüsüne, belli başlı petrol ve doğal gaz boru hatları başta olmak 
üzere, depolama kapasitesi, kanuni ve gerekli mevzuat değerlendirilerek, uzun dönem 
spot fiyat mekanizması ve son olarak, likit doğal gazın gelecekteki potansiyel katkısı ele 
alınarak irdelenmiştir. Bölgedeki enerji ihraç eden ülkelerin mevcut durumları, 
Türkiye’nin ek kapasite yaratabilme yetisi ve mevcut koşullar çerçevesinde öngörülüp 
değerlendirilmiş olup, Türkiye’nin enerji merkezi ülke olma yolundaki temel eksiklikler 
ve bu konudaki önkoşullar tartışılıp, eksikliklerin nasıl giderilebileceği konusunda 
tavsiyelerde bulunulmuştur. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With its geostrategic importance and its proximity to major global oil and gas fields in 
the Middle Eastern and Caspian region, Turkey has become a major energy transit 
country in the region with diverse supply routes and sources as well as an established 
strength in energy security. Indeed, operational oil and gas pipelines such as Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and those under construction such as Trans-
Anatolian pipeline (TANAP), in addition to its two main straits in the Bosporus and 
Dardanelles, have caused researchers such as Erdoğdu1, Müftüler Baç and Başkan2 to 
suggest that Turkey is not only an energy transit country, but in fact an energy hub that 
is only likely to grow in significance in future years. However, other scholars have 
suggested that Turkey needs to overcome certain difficulties in order to become an 
energy hub in the region, and some, such as Winrow3, Yılmaz4 and Iseri5, see Turkey as 
just an energy corridor or energy transit country rather than an energy hub. Even though 
a substantial percentage of the world’s energy supply has passed through Turkey in 
recent years, it can be suggested that Turkey still has certain prerequisites to fulfill in 
pursuing its intention to become an energy hub.  
Turkey’s very first natural gas reserves were discovered in 1976. Since then, overall 
consumption has increased not only for industrial and household consumption but also 
for natural gas utilized for electricity generation which soon resulted in the need to 
import supplies. By 1984 Turkey had signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
USSR to import natural gas, and by 1986, an agreement covering twenty-five years was 
                                                
1 Erdoğdu E., (2014), Turkey’s Energy Strategy and its Role in the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor. Instituto Affari 
Internazionali   
2 Müftüler-Baç, M., & Başkan, D “the Future of Energy Security for Europe: Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor” 
(2011, March). http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/publication/the-future-of-energy-security-for-europe-turkeys-role-as-an-
energy-corridor/ 
3 Winrow, G., “Turkey: An Emerging Energy Transit State and Possible Energy Hub”, The International Spectator, 
Italian Journal of International Affairs, 2011, 
4 Yılmaz, B. (2012, February). The Role of Turkey in the European Energy Market. 
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/publication/the-role-of-turkey-in-the-european-energy-market/ 
5 Iseri E., and Almaz A., (2013), Turkey’s Energy Strategy and the Southern Gas Corridor 
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signed between the Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ) and 
Soyuzgazexport, Russia’s state gas export company, later GAZPROM Export, to carry 
gas through the Russia-Turkey West Pipeline. Turkey also signed an agreement to 
import LNG and natural gas from Algeria by means of marine transportation in 1986. 
With an aim of creating a framework for the natural gas sector which would prove 
competitive and encourage a transparent market structure, a new law was enacted in 
2001. 6 According to the International Energy Agency, in 2012 Turkey imported 89.3% 
of its oil in 2012 and 98% of its natural gas in 2011, which makes Turkey heavily 
dependent on outside resources for its energy needs. Therefore, the diversification of 
energy sources and routes in addition to a secure energy supply has become an 
important issue for Turkey. To this end Turkey constructed its first pipelines between 
1977 and 1987 at Kirkuk-Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast. 7It would be appropriate 
to consider some of these major oil and natural gas pipelines, whether operational or 
under construction, in order to better grasp Turkey’s position in the region. These lines 
enable an evaluation of whether Turkey is an energy hub country or rather a major 
energy transit country and place the conclusions of the skeptics, Winrow8, Yılmaz9 and 
Iseri10, in context.  
The idea of whether Turkey can be designated an energy corridor and an energy hub has 
been thoroughly debated in the literature, however, it is not yet clear what constitutes an 
energy hub or energy corridor. Distinguishing  between these two ambiguous concepts, 
which are often used interchangeably in the literature, is of the utmost importance in 
determining the role Turkey could play as a potential energy hub country in the region. 
As a common delivery point, a gas hub serves both the buyers and the sellers as an entry 
and exit point to trade and transfer gas.11 It can be claimed that Turkey needs plentiful 
                                                
6 General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs, BOTAS http://www.pigm.gov.tr/ - http://www.botas.gov.tr/ 
7 Ozturk M., and Yüksel Y.E., Ozek N., (2011), A Bridge Between East and West: Turkey’s Natural Gas Policy, 
Elsevier  
8 Winrow, G., “Turkey: An Emerging Energy Transit State and Possible Energy Hub”, The International Spectator, 
Italian Journal of International Affairs, 2011, 
9 Yılmaz, B. (2012, February). The Role of Turkey in the European Energy Market 
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/publication/the-role-of-turkey-in-the-european-energy-market/ 
10 Iseri E., and Almaz A., (2013), Turkey’s Energy Strategy and the Southern Gas Corridor 
11 Karbuz, S., “ Turkey as an energy hub”, OME, 2016, p.2 
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gas from numerous suppliers with volumes way above the country’s current 
consumption so as to create a gas surplus, which can be re-exported through hub 
channels. energy hub, therefore, requires a mixture of a variety of sources whereby no 
party has the ability to override the wishes of any other party. Above all, an energy hub 
offers both financial as well as physical trading which covers LNG, pipelines and well-
constructed storage capacity. 12  In the case of an energy corridor country, on the other 
hand, a variety of gas and oil pipelines pass between hydrocarbon rich East to the 
energy hungry West as a natural bridge; however, while corridor countries also receive 
transit fees, they have no right to re-export oil and gas that pass through their territory.13 
Turkey’s position as an energy corridor means that in energy negotiations it remains a 
‘price-taking’ rather than a ‘price-setting’ country, determining neither the prices 
charged nor quantities granted for energy importing countries.  
Given Turkey’s strategic importance, the elevation of its status to that of an energy hub 
could potentially boost the prospect for Turkey to better provide energy security both at 
home and for the EU market. Since Turkey’s accession negations with the EU have 
reached a stalemate and the EU’s energy acquis is blocked for an indefinite period of 
time, a carefully constructed framework for the designation of a gas hub should be 
proposed. Commercial and political complications that impede Turkey’s becoming a 
genuine energy trading hub also need to be resolved with an aim of better serving this 
ambition as well as enhancing the overall prospect for eventual EU accession in the 
long-term.14 
The outline of this thesis is as follows: in chapter one the major natural gas and oil 
pipelines are examined in order to establish the viability of Turkey’s objective of 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.ikv.org.tr/images/files/Sohbet_Karbuz_Sunum.pdf 
12 Roberts, J., “Turkey as a Regional Energy Hub”, Insight Turkey, 2010, P. 42 
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_12_no_3_2010_roberts.pdf 
13 Bilgin, M., “ Turkey’s Energy Strategy: What difference deos it maket to become enery transit corridor, hub, or 
center”, UNISCI discussion paper, 2010, p. 114 
https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72504/UNISCI%20DP%2023%20-%20BILGIN.pdf 
14Winrow, G., “ Problems and Progress for the “Fourth Corridor”: the Positions and the Role oF Turkey in Gas 
Transit Europe”, OIES, 2009 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/problems-and-prospects-for-the-fourth-corridor-the-position-and-role-of-
turkey-in-gas-transit-to-europe/ 
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becoming an energy hub; in chapter two the reasons underlying why Turkey aspires to 
become an energy hub are evaluated, a framework that better clarifies the concept of an 
energy hub is proposed based on a template established by the European Federation of 
Energy Traders (EFET), and the major shortcomings that stand against Turkey’s goal 
are described and solutions recommended; in chapter three future projections based on 
the current capacity of regional energy exporters, KRG, Qatar, Israel, Cyprus and 
Azerbaijan, are formulated with regard to creating spare capacity for trade, a vital 
prerequisite for becoming an energy hub; Turkey’s potential for providing energy 
security for the European Union (EU) gas market is evaluated in chapter four within the 
framework of EU energy policy.  
The main research question which this thesis aims to answer is whether Turkey can 
become an energy hub for the region and it can play play a significant role in helping to 
improve the EU’s energy security. This will be addressed by focusing particularly on 
Turkey’s currently operational as well as projected oil and natural gas pipelines so as to 
explore the reasons why Turkey can, through diversifying energy routes and sources, 
overcome impediments to meeting the requirements to reach this aspiration. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MAJOR NATURAL OIL AND GAS PIPELINES IN TURKEY 
Kirkuk Ceyhan Oil Pipeline 
The first part of a crude oil pipeline constructed in Turkey was the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line 
in 1977 and its second was constructed in 1987. Currently, both pipelines carry up to 
350,000 barrels a day, although operational capacity reaches 600,000 barrels per day at 
full capacity.15 Even though Iraq has the third largest oil reserves in the world, due to 
the Iraq-Iran war and the American- British invasion in 2003, the transportation of oil 
from Iraq has stalled several times. 16As Iraqi officials stated in the Iraqi newspaper 
Rudaw on January 2014, in the year 2013 alone the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline was 
attacked more than fifty times, which caused the interruption of oil exported to the 
Ceyhan Terminal. As can be seen from the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline map below, the 
pipeline routes pass through some of the most dangerous territory in the region. The line 
passes through not only Iraq but also South-East Turkey which makes it vulnerable to 
the threat from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and many projects attached to the 
line have consequently been hampered. Such uncertainties, as well as economic and 
political turmoil and the uncertain future of Iraq, are unlikely to be resolved anytime 
soon; therefore, while Iraq initially looks like an attractive option for diversifying 
energy resources and routes for Turkey, the gas transported from Iraq is not a viable 
option for the time being since supply is unreliable for all the above mentioned reasons. 
Consequently, oil and gas from Iraq is not a sustainable option for securing the region’s 
energy supply nor can it fulfill Turkey’s desire to become an energy hub in the region.17 
 
  
                                                
15 Fandrich, D., Iden, M., “ Attacks Shuts Down 970 km Transnational Oil Pipeline”, Pipeline Technology Journal, 
2016 
http://www.pipeline-journal.net/news/attack-shuts-down-970-km-kirkuk-ceyhan-transnational-oil-pipeline 
16 Yılmaz B., (2012), “The Role of Turkey in the European Energy Market”, MEDAC, P.12 
17 Evin. A.O., (2012), “Energy and Turkey’s Neighbourhood: Post Soviet Transformations and Transatlantic 
Interest”, Lynne Reiner. 
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Figure 1: Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline  
 
Source: Valeura Energy Inc. 
 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline 
With an initial total capacity of one million barrels of oil a day and with its 1768 km 
long pipeline, the second longest of its kind, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)’s 
inauguration ceremony took place in 2006. This project was perceived as a milestone in 
creating an environment for the east-west energy corridor that would help the 
landlocked Azerbaijan to transport oil to the West, particularly to Europe. The pipeline 
extends from Azeri-Chirag-Gunaşli fields to Tbilisi-Georgia and ends in Ceyhan 
Terminal. 18As can be seen from the map below, the pipeline bypasses the Black Sea 
and therefore reduces the dependency on Russian co-operation and diversifying energy 
routes. As of 2006, Kazakhstan also joined the BTC, and planned to carry crude oil by 
shipping it through the Caspian Sea, from where Kazak crude oil would be pumped 
directly to the BTC pipeline and transported to Ceyhan. 19  
                                                
18 İpek P., (2006), “The Aftermath of Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan Pipeline: Challenges Ahead for Turkey, Perceptions”.  
19 Evin, op. cit., p.8 
  7 
According to BP Azerbaijan’s data, the current capacity of BTC is around 1.2 million 
barrels per day, representing a 20 percent increase over the initial capacity.20 With the 
BTC pipeline, only 1.5% of the total world oil demand has been met. In this regard, one 
can suggest that the amount of crude oil that has been transported by the pipeline is not 
substantial enough in terms of volume to turn Turkey into an energy hub. On the other 
hand, with the construction of the BTC pipeline it can be claimed that strategic 
dependence on oil in the region, particularly for Middle Eastern and Russian oil 
demand, will be diminished for both Turkey and Europe, and therefore it contributes to 
the energy security of all parties that are in real need of meeting high energy demands. 
 
Figure 2: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
 
 Source: Petroleum Pipeline Corporation   
Samsun Ceyhan Pipeline 
Turkey has two major straits through which super oil tankers can pass: the Bosporus 
and the Dardanelles. As of 2012, 3.7% of total world oil supply had to be shipped 
through these straits in order to reach to the world energy market. However, these 
                                                
20 http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html 
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vessels carry hazardous liquids that threaten the environment and are putting the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles at risk. Most of the super tankers and vessels carry Russian 
and Kazak oil through the Black Sea. In order to reduce environmental risks and the 
cost of the transportation cost in the long run, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement 
in 2006 to construct Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline.    
Presently, the Samsun Ceyhan Pipeline project is on hold due to the disagreement 
between the parties. The Minister of Energy and Natural Resource of Turkey, Taner 
Yıldız, stated on CNN Turk on 15th of April 2013 that “The Samsun-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline project is important for Turkey, but the country’s political principles are above 
all”. Upon the completion of the project, there will be certain benefits that Turkey will 
enjoy. First of all, the number of ships that goes through the Bosporus will be lessened. 
As a result of this, the environment will be affected positively. As Yılmaz (2012:13) 
points out, “the amount of oil transported through the strait of Istanbul has increased 
dramatically from 60 million tons in 1996 to almost 150 million of tons in 2007”. This 
increase shows us how important it is to have such a project so as to mitigate against 
environmental consequences that may be irrevocable for the Turkish Straits. However, 
we can also conclude that once this project is complete and becomes operational, it will 
increase the Turkish dependency on Russian oil and in this regard, the Turkey’s desire 
for being an energy hub in the region will be hindered. 
Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) 
In 2012, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an agreement to construct a new pipeline that 
would carry Azeri gas to Turkey. The project is expected to be completed in 2018 and is 
projected to carry16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas, 10 bcm of which will be 
transported to Europe and 6 bcm of which will be used by Turkey. 21 
The TANAP official website states that the volume of gas that will be exported is 
expected to increase in 2023 to the level of 23bcm and the volume of gas to be 
transported will be 31 bcm as of 2030.  Looking at the initial volume of gas to be 
transferred via Turkey, we can see that it is nowhere near enough to fulfil the current 
                                                
21 Erdoğdu E., (2014), Turkey’s Energy Strategy and its Role in the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor. Instituto Affari 
Internazionali   
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European and Turkish energy demand; however, doubling the volume within one 
decade would certainly help to meet the expectations of both the European and the 
Turkish energy market. On the other hand, in 2013 British Petroleum (BP) and the State 
Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) signed an agreement on another natural 
gas pipeline called Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which is estimated to cost around 5 
billion USD. This pipeline will transfer Azerbaijani natural gas to the European Market. 
The main source of gas will come from the second Shah Deniz in the Caspian Sea. As 
can be seen from the map below, the pipeline will connect Azerbaijan to Georgia and 
from Georgia it will extend to the Turkey-EU border where it will reach its final 
destination: Europe. Both Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) will constitute the Southern Gas Corridor. It is estimated that in the 
future TANAP will be able to carry more natural gas due to the possibility of carrying 
Iraqi gas. When political stability returns to Iraq, Iraqi gas can be connected to the 
TANAP grid and therefore this normalization process would increase the supply of gas. 
Iraq, Turkey and eventually Europe would benefit from this diversified energy supply. 
Nevertheless, the political tension seems set to continue for the foreseeable future and 
the possibility of realizing this project currently seems slim due to the Iraq’s internal 
security problems.22  
Once the Southern Gas Corridor becomes operational, both Turkish and Azerbaijani 
relations with Europe are likely to be strengthened and therefore, with TANAP, 
Turkey’s position in accession negotiations towards becoming a member of the 
European Union (EU) is likely to improve. As stated by Erdoğdu “the TANAP and TAP 
projects mean the pipeline will no longer be used by Europe as a bargaining tool in its 
policies towards Azerbaijan and Turkey, but will instead give more power to Azerbaijan 
and Turkey in their relations with the EU”. 23 
Another important point is that with the TANAP project Turkey will secure the right to 
re-export as much as 750 million cubic meters of excess gas reserves to other countries 
annually, and Greece in particular is likely to be a major recipient of such reserves. 
Azerbaijan allows Turkey to re-export its gas and to profit from this incentive, while 
                                                
22 Erdoğdu E., (2014), P. 1-16 
23 Ibid, P.12 
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Russia and Iran do not.24 Therefore Turkey will not only profit from the transit fees of 
the transportation of gas across its land but also may benefit from the re- exportation of 
gas. For this reason, on completion of TANAP, Turkey will become one of the major 
energy transit states in the region. Nevertheless, to become a major energy hub, Turkey 
will have to continue to develop its energy commitments, and build bigger storage 
facilities and terminals, for instance. Indeed, the annual progress report written by the 
European Commission in 2013 specifically states that in the field of gas, Turkey cannot 
yet be considered an energy hub. The report remarks that “no progress can be reported 
on a transparent gas transit regime” and concludes by stating that “a functioning 
competitive market and progress in legislative alignment in the natural gas sector are 
still lacking”25. Liberalizing the gas market, making its practices more transparent and 
developing a strong infrastructure would strengthen Turkey’s hand in fulfilling the basic 
requirements for becoming a genuine energy hub. Nevertheless, it would be over-
ambitious to claim that TANAP will play a major role in both energy security and 
diversification of energy sources in the short term with a projected volume of only 16 
bcm. Only by increasing the amount of gas transported to the level of 31 bcm in 2030, 
supported by Turkmen or Iraqi gas, which would increase the volume to such a level, 
would Turkey’s position become stronger, particularly when we consider the fact that  
in 2015 OECD-Europe consumed 453,4 bcm of natural gas, according to the data 
provided by BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016.26  
 
  
                                                
24 Winrow G.M., (2013)., The Southern Gas Corridor and Turkey’s Role as Energy Transit State Energy Hub, Insight 
Turkey 
25 EU Commission, (2013) Turkey Annual Progress Report, P.36 
26 http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-review-of-world-
energy-2016-full-report.pdf 
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Figure 3: Southern Corridor-TANAP-TAP 
 
Sources: The European Institute 
Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
The Initial steps were taken by BOTAŞ (Turkey) and its counterparts TRANSGAS 
(Romania), BULGARGAZ (Bulgaria), MOL (Hungary) and lastly OMV Gas (Austria) 
back in 2002 to construct a new pipeline called Nabucco, whose name comes from a 
famous opera of Verdi. The pipeline was projected to carry Azeri and Turkmen gas to 
the Western European market by 2015, with an expected volume of 25 to 30 bcm 
annually. Additionally, not only Caspian gas but also in the long term Iraqi gas may 
have been transported by using a pipeline constructed by the Nabucco project. Another 
important step was taken among the partner countries in 2009 to complete Nabucco’s 
construction by as early as 2015 so as to transfer natural gas to the Western European 
market. 27 
With the announcement of the Nabucco project, the international community, 
particularly the EU and the USA, showed great support for the project’s 
implementation, believing it would safeguard Europe’s energy security, as well as 
Turkey’s. The project has been perceived as an alternative to Russian supremacy in the 
region as the Nabucco project would diminish dependence on Russian gas by 
diversifying gas sources and its transportation routes. Müftüler Baç and Başkan state 
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that the “Nabucco project would make a bigger difference to the energy security of the 
EU by diminishing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and to Turkey’s role as an 
'energy hub”.28 More than just proclaiming Turkey to be a potential energy hub, it can 
be further suggested that, in terms of securing energy supply sources, Turkey’s position 
in its EU accession negotiations would certainly be improved. An expected volume of 
25 to 30 bcm of gas would bring Turkey nowhere near its ambition to become an energy 
hub given the fact that when the project was announced in 2009, the EU consumed 
464.4 bcm of gas. Consequently while one-third of gas still comes from Russia, the 
proposed volume of gas would not have significantly altered the way the EU’s gas 
portfolio was set even if the project had come online as planned. 
However, the project was halted in 2010 and ended officially in 2013, due to lack of 
adequate volumes of gas and inflexibility as well as unwillingness among stakeholders 
to take further steps to complete the project on time. With this failure, Turkey’s 
ambition to become a genuine energy transit country was severely harmed: “when the 
EC lost Nabucco, Turkey lost its chance to show the decisiveness of transit countries in 
the energy market”. 29 
It can be concluded that if Nabucco had been operational, this opportunity would have 
strengthened Turkey’s hand by increasing the transit revenues and the royalties of the 
country. Also, Turkey’s bargaining power with the EU in opening an energy chapter 
would have been stronger and Turkey would have been in a better position to become a 
major energy transit state in the region. 
In the event of energy shortages, Turkey’s gas storage facilities would not be sufficient 
to meet the demands of the energy importing countries, nor would Turkey have any say 
in determining the price of the gas. In this regard, Turkey’s current energy policy will 
not be able to meet the prerequisite conditions to become an energy hub. The 
cancellation of the Nabucco project has derailed, for the time being, Turkey’s chances 
in this regard. 
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Figure 4: Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
: 
 
Source: Eurodialog.org 
 
The Blue Stream Gas Pipeline 
Energy cooperation between Russia and Turkey began in 1997. Initially, the Blue 
Stream pipeline was planned to consist of three different parts. The pipeline starts in the 
Russian town of Izobilnoye in the Black Sea, goes under the Black Sea to the Turkish 
town of Durusu and reaches its final destination in Ankara. Currently, Russia is 
planning to extend this pipeline route either to Ceyhan or to Izmir. The volume of 
natural gas that has been transferred via this pipeline remains low compared to other 
major pipelines. As of 2004, the transported gas was approximately 3.2 bcm and in 
2005, reached4.5 bcm. However, since then, the volume of natural gas imported from 
Russia has increased exponentially, reaching the level of 26.7 bcm in 2013. 30 
The pie chart below indicates which countries supply Turkey’s natural gas needs. As of 
2012, 58% of Turkey’s natural gas demand was met by Russia.  It is evident that Turkey 
is heavily dependent on Russia in terms of its natural gas consumption. In this respect, 
we can suggest that any country that is heavily dependent on a particular country for its 
energy needs will necessarily be dependent on that supplier country to such an extent 
that the energy demanding country will have no stake in determining or challenging the 
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supplier country in terms of settling price and supply levels. In this sense, Turkey can 
be considered to be in a weak position by not diversifying its energy sources. Unless 
Turkey can reduce its dependency on Russia, the country’s desire to become an energy 
hub will not be realized and will only remain part of its strategic plan. 
: 
Figure 5: Turkey’s Natural Gas Imports 
 
 
 
 
                          
 
Source: EMRA, Natural Gas Sector Report, 2012  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Blue Stream Pipeline 
: 
 
Sources: Gazprom, Blue Stream Pipeline (bcm) 
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Turkish Stream Gas Pipeline 
Figure 7: Turkish Stream/ Southern Gas Corridor 
 
The announcement made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 2nd 2014 
cancelling the long planned pipeline South Stream project and instead proposing a 
major pipeline dubbed the Turkish Stream came as a complete surprise. With this 
proposal Russia intended to bypass Ukraine and carry natural gas both to Turkey as well 
as to the EU. 31 The unexpected U-turn by the Russian government to suspend the South 
Stream pipeline and the controversial decision to launch a brand new pipeline have 
raised eyebrows in the surrounding region, primarily in the EU. It has raised the 
question of whether this project is commercially viable, physically possible and 
financially sound, particularly for Russia and Turkey, since such an exorbitantly costly 
pipeline project has been planned with financing from Russia’s Gazprom, in 
collaboration with Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ) only, with no 
other stakeholders involved. Furthermore, transportation arrangements in Europe, and 
the signing of purchase contracts32 have not yet been finalized.    
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The eventual volume of the Turkish Stream has maintained the same capacity of the 
South Stream of which 14 bcm is intended to supply Turkey, and the rest, 49 bcm, for 
EU consumption. Initially, pipelines will be laid in four strings and each with a capacity 
of 15.75 bcm. The first string will feed the Turkish gas market at Kıyıkoy in the 
European part of Turkey and the remainder, three pipelines, will carry gas to Western 
Europe, reaching Ipsala near the Turkish-Greek border.33  
With the South Stream project, the plan was to deliver gas to the various states in the 
EU such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy and Austria. Nevertheless, with the 
Turkish Stream, it was projected that Russia would deliver gas to the Turkish-Greek 
border and from that point on it would be left to EU countries to deliver gas where 
needed.34  Additionally, the Bulgarian approach towards the South Stream project 
during the implementation of the project phases changed considerably on account of 
pressure that came from other EU states and EU institutions. The Kremlin’s desire not 
to include Bulgaria in any stage of the Turkish Stream project was interpreted as a way 
of punishing the Bulgarian authority. In considering these issues, Russia’s approach 
towards Ukraine and to some other Eastern European states has clearly been changed 
according to Moscow’s red lines and priorities with regard to the Turkish Stream. 
During the Soviet era Ukraine had been a reliable transit route for Russia, even after the 
breakup of the USSR. At the end of 2013, Russia’s Gazprom sent over 82 bcm of 
natural gas to the EU market via Ukraine. However, gas conflicts between the parties 
emerged from time to time especially disagreement over gas prices which increased 
tensions to such a level that in both 2006 and 2009 Russia decided to cut off the gas. 
The crisis that erupted between Kiev and Moscow resulted in a two-week long gas 
disruption in Eastern and Central Europe in 2009. This event raised the question of 
whether Russia as a major supply source could be a reliable supply partner and whether 
Ukraine should be regarded as a reliable supply route.  
Ukraine, as a result, has responded to the crises by reducing its heavy reliance on 
Russian gas. On the other hand Moscow has decided to terminate gas exports to the EU 
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market via Ukraine from 2019 and bypass Ukrainian territory by launching a strategy of 
diversifying its gas routes, such as via the Turkish Stream and Nord Stream pipelines to 
circumvent Ukraine. Despite both parties’ hasty attempts to defuse the situation, the 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies’ Jonathan Stern asserts that it is not within the 
bounds of possibility to phase out gas transition between Russia and Ukraine, at least 
not until 2020, due to existing contracts with major European countries. Regarding the 
possibility of phasing out the gas supply in 2019 between Russia and Ukraine, the head 
of the Strategic Energy & Economic Company, Michael Lynch, claims that, “ if you’ve 
got customers and a line through Ukraine— and an oil price of 50USD— you’re not 
going to cut off the gas”.35 Considering the fact that Russia exports approximately 
seventy percent of its gas to the EU market, any failure of future gas contracts would 
devastate Russia’s heavily hydrocarbon-based economy. Therefore, it would be 
plausible to predict that the Kremlin would do everything in their power to secure their 
market in Europe. 
Although Russia defended the Turkish Stream from the point of view that once it was 
completed the pipeline would have a profound impact on the EU’s overall energy 
security. The EU has been extremely doubtful about both parties’ intentions, and 
therefore initiated a policy of diversification of supply source as part of the third energy 
package strategy. From the EU point of view, the Turkish Stream has meant “an attempt 
to thwart the Southern Gas Corridor— hence the EU’s objection to Greek Plans to back 
the project.”36 Furthermore, following the downing of the Russian air force jet near the 
Syrian-Turkish border in November 2015, the future viability of the Turkish Stream has 
changed from a potentially game-changing pipeline to victim of regional tension 
identical to Nabucco or the South Stream pipeline projects. As prominent energy 
security expert John Roberts puts it, “Russia’s ambitious project for its Turkish Stream 
gas pipeline across the Black Sea looks set to become the next casualty of the war of 
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words between Russian President Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan”.37 
Subsequently, while Russia has not yet openly announced that the Turkish Stream has 
been frozen for an unknown period of time, the Kremlin has stated that priority will be 
given to the construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline, which could be interpreted as 
demonstrating that the Turkish Stream has been put on hold for the time being as part of 
Russia’s retaliation towards Turkey. Russia, prior to the unfortunate event, spent over 
1.8bn on pipelines for the first and second strings to be laid under the seabed of the 
Black Sea. In addition to that, Gazprom spent almost 400 million USD38 for pipe-laying 
vessels, as well as on the cost of ceasing operations, which would mean writing-off a 
considerable expense unless the project is revitalized and tension between the parties 
settles down. 
If Russia totally abandons the Turkish Stream project, and would therefore no longer be 
willing to supply Turkey’s constantly growing energy needs, Turkey would need to 
have alternative options in order to overcome energy shortages. In 2013, a contract 
signed with the KRG with an initial delivery of 4bcm until 2017,39 is one of the primary 
examples of Turkey’s initial steps towards reducing Russia’s dominant position in the 
Turkish gas portfolio.  
Overall the Turkish Stream would likely increase Russian presence in both the Turkish 
and South- East European gas mixture. Countries such as Greece, Bulgaria or Romania 
claim that with the availability of the Turkish Stream there is the possibility of the 
creation of a European regional gas hub given the large volume of gas which would 
flood to the EU market from the South-Eastern borders. However, this approach is not 
plausible since dependence on Russian gas has already reached approximately thirty 
percent and with the realization of the Turkish Stream this volume will increase 
exponentially to a level at which Russia’s supremacy in the European gas market will 
be strongly felt. It can be claimed that Russia’s supremacy in the region would only 
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create an energy corridor rather than an energy-trading hub, since an energy hub 
requires a mixture of a variety of sources whereby no party has the ability to override 
the wishes of any other party. Above all, if the Turkish Stream project comes into 
existence and an additional 50 bcm of Russian gas flows into the EU gas market, it is 
likely that the success of the Southern Gas Corridor and its aim of diversification of 
supply source, confirmed by the third energy package, would likely be jeopardized and 
the Kremlin’s interests served. 
The Role of The Southern Gas Corridor: A Genuine Attempt to Diversify away 
from Russia’s Dominance in The Region   
A continuing decline in conventional gas production in Europe combined with 
increasingly costly gas imports from Russia have meant that the Caspian region will 
remain one of the most promising sources of natural gas for the EU. The plan to bring 
Caspian gas to the EU market has been on the agenda for about a decade but due to 
faltering commitments and various obstacles, this has not been fully accomplished. 
However, in November 2009, at the European Commission (EC) summit in Prague a 
policy initiative called “Southern Corridor- New Silk Road” was launched with the aim 
of facilitating the flow of Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to the European gas market 
in order to diminish reliance on Russian natural gas. At this summit, “An EU Energy 
Security and Solidarity Action Plan” identified potential partner countries that would 
supply energy to the EU market. Countries located in the Caspian region 
(Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey) and Middle Eastern 
countries (Iran and Iraq) along with neighbouring North African countries were 
projected to be major energy supplier countries to the EU market.40  
Originally three major natural gas pipelines were planned to bring Caspian gas to the 
EU energy market, the very first of which was the introduction of the Nabucco pipeline. 
The EU enthusiastically backed this pipeline since it would bypass Russia. Although 
Nabucco was on the agenda since 2002, this scheme would have been projected to be 
part of the Southern Gas Corridor. A second plan aimed to connect Caspian gas to the 
EU by an interconnector that was intended to be constructed between Turkey-Greece 
                                                
40 Cutler, R.M., “The Role of the Southern Gas Corridor In Prospects for European Energy Security”, Institute of 
European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, P. 29 
  20 
and Italy (ITGI). The third step would have been to construct the White stream pipeline, 
an undersea project that was aimed at connecting Georgia to the Balkans. However, 
both the Nabucco plan and the White Stream projects were withdrawn and ITGI’s first 
phase was installed and has been operational for some time: the second phase of ITGI, 
connecting Greece to Italy was replaced by the Trans Adriatic Project.41 
Although some analytical references state that the South Stream project was part of the 
Southern Gas Corridor project, this project has never been part of the initiative. On the 
contrary, it was introduced to compete with the Nabucco pipeline and therefore 
rendered construction of the Trans Caspian Pipeline unnecessary and prevented a transit 
gas route between Central Asia and Europe from being realized. In the 1990’s the 
Kremlin had used much the same geopolitical tactic in the construction of the Blue 
Stream pipeline, which has proven to be successful despite the fact that its initial 
planned capacity was underutilized and that it was not the best financially viable 
option.42 
Turkey’s Role in the Southern Gas Corridor: A Prospect for Diversification 
Until very recently most energy scenarios were based on the assumption that the 
consumption of natural gas in the EU market will increase in the coming years and 
decades. Due to weak economic performance and better promotion of renewables, 
combined with a fierce competition with cheaper coal, the EU’s gas consumption has 
not been robust in recent years. Although in 2008 and the following years consumption 
was too low to confirm the above scenario’s assumption, according to the International 
Energy Agency’s New Policies Scenario, Europe’s gas imports would reach to 400 bcm 
by 2040 while in 2013 it was 260bcm.43 Therefore, the source of supply from the 
Caspian region has become an issue of some urgency, allowing for the Southern 
Corridor strategy to be a useful tool for EU’s energy security objectives. Since most EU 
countries have been heavily dependent Russian sources for their gas imports, at this 
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point Turkey’s position in the region has moved to the forefront of the political agenda 
as a new and proactive partner that would offer the ideal ground for secure, affordable 
energy for the EU market. Having ambitions to become an energy hub in the region, 
Turkey would do well to work diligently to cooperate on energy issues that would 
provide Europe with “a reliable alternative supple route and offer Turkey the 
opportunity to prove that it is an indispensable partner for the EU”.44  
  
Figure 8: European Natural Gas Imports 
 
 Source: World Energy Outlook, IEA, 2014. 
Turkey’s geostrategic position is, as Richert states, “sitting on the only transit route 
substantially free of Russia”.45 Several pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline have been 
constructed to connect the Azerbaijani Caspian Sea to the EU energy market. Although 
the 1700 km long BTC pipeline has facilitated oil exports from the Azeri-Chirag-
Guneshli field all the way from Georgia to Turkey, it carries less than 1.5% of global oil 
demand; but with the BTC pipeline, the EU has “gained access to valuable new crude 
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oil supplies that did not pass through Russia”.46 As the former US secretary of energy, 
Bill Richardson pointed out, “This is not just another oil and gas deal, and this is not 
just another pipeline. […] It is a strategic vision for the future of the Caspian region”.47 
The BTC has signalled a shift to Azerbaijani sources and created  hopes for other 
projects to come online. With the BTC as a source of inspiration, combined with 
disappointment about the deceased Nabucco project, in 2012, the Trans-Anatolian 
pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) duel project has been suggested 
as an alternative, which has so far proven to be successful in bringing Shah Deniz gas to 
the Turkish border.  
Major oil and natural gas pipelines in Turkey, whether they are operational or under 
construction, not only have helped Turkey to diversify its own imported energy sources 
but also assisted Turkey in its quest to become an energy hub, extending Turkey’s 
horizons in its energy relations with neighboring countries.  
In light of these circumstances, to better grasp Turkey’s position as a provider of energy 
security for Europe and therefore positioning itself as a net beneficiary energy corridor 
country, I will take a closer look at the prominent features of current energy suppliers 
and will address the salient aspects of each that would overlap with Turkey’s desire to 
be an energy hub in the region.  
Turkmenistan 
Turkmenistan is included in this survey because it is considered to be a potential 
supplier in future.  According to the BP statistical review 2015, Turkmenistan holds the 
4th largest gas reserves in the world after Russia, Iran and Qatar, having a total of 9.3% 
of the reserve. With the recent discovery of the second biggest Galkynysh gas field, 
Turkmenistan’s gas reserves are estimated to reach 17.5 trillion cubic meters (tcm).48 It 
can be claimed that Turkmenistan has emerged as a Caspian energy power in the region. 
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Among all the other major energy supplying countries, it is believed that Turkmenistan 
potentially has the greatest reserves to boost the gas production for Caspian gas 
consumers, in particular European consumers. A key intention of Europe has been to 
access Turkmen gas through a subsea pipeline that cross Caspian Sea as part of the 
Southern Gas Corridor project. Currently, Turkmenistan exports gas to Iran, Russia, 
China and Kazakhstan; however, with the construction of the Trans Caspian pipeline 
Turkmenistan can potentially link to the Southern Corridor in order to export to the EU 
gas market.49 In 2011, the Trans Caspian pipeline system was introduced to connect the 
EU with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to bring a new source of gas to the Europe. A 
300km pipeline system would prove to be less costly and technically problematic as 
other projects that stretch thousands of miles over continents. It is reported that 30 bcm 
of gas can be exported through the Trans Caspian pipeline to Europe. Nevertheless, 
there has been very little progress since the project was proposed due primarily to a lack 
of interest from the Turkmen side.  
Nonetheless, there are territorial as well as diplomatic barriers which need to be 
overcome for the Trans Caspian pipeline to be realized. First of all, Russia and Iran 
have not favored this project from the very beginning since Russia claims that any 
infrastructural project that would involve the Caspian Sea needs to be approved by the 
five littoral states of the Caspian Sea, namely Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan 
and lastly, Kazakhstan. Secondly, the more challenging hurdles for the construction of 
this pipeline have been related to the financial aspect of the project. As Cutler and 
Korchemkin clearly point out, “A sizeable barrier to the project is Turkmenistan’s 
policy to leave the financing construction of pipeline export routes to those that wants 
its gas”.50 Because the countries involved in this project have not resolved this financial 
aspect of the project, it could be understood that one of the main pillars of the Southern 
Gas Corridor will not be realized until the major energy companies, the EU, and transit 
countries shoulder the responsibility of bringing the project to fruition.51  
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Its highly unlikely that the three major impediments outlined above will be resolved 
anytime soon, which further strengthens the idea that the Trans-Caspian pipeline project 
intended to connect Turkmen gas to the EU is more the result of wishful-thinking than 
the reality on the ground.  
Turkmenistan has prioritized its gas market expansion towards China with the recently 
constructed Central Asia-China gas pipeline with a volume of 30 bcm. This 
improvement could be interpreted as meaning that the incumbent government in 
Turkmenistan is seeking an eastward expansion as a feasible strategy to strengthen its 
position in the region. Back in 2013, when the former EU Energy Commissioner 
Günther H. Oettinger requested a meeting with the Turkmen President 
Berdymukhamedov, he was refused, and no interest in further integration in gas trading 
with the EU has been evident. This unwillingness of the Turkmen side can be linked to 
two major reasons: first, political pressure from the Kremlin might increase if 
Turkmenistan threatens Russia’s supremacy in the EU natural gas market and second, 
successful implementation of the Central Asia-China pipeline has satisfied 
Turkmenbashi to such an extent that Turkmenistan does not seek other parties having 
secured a significant market with China for the time being. Senior Advisor of the 
Bureau of Energy Resources for the US Department of State, Daniel Stein, clearly 
explains the reluctance of the Turkmen government to work with the EU, explaining the 
underlying reasons as follows, “The problem is that while the Chinese are able to say to 
the Turkmens, ‘we need your gas; we will build you a pipeline,’ Europe does not have 
the resources and is ambivalent about challenging Russia.”52 Overall, the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline does not represent a physically deliverable and commercially attractive 
prospect for both Turkey and the EU, thus this pipeline project does not represent the 
most viable option. Whether this project will ever be realized, therefore, remains to be 
seen in the years ahead.  
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Azerbaijan 
With proven reserves of 1.2 tcm of natural gas and 7 bn barrels of crude oil, Azerbaijan 
is one of the major gas and oil suppliers to the Turkish energy market. 53 The largest 
portion of crude oil production comes from the offshore Azeri-Guneshli-Chirag field, 
which is 100km away from the capital city, Baku. Although oil production peaked in 
2010 at one million b/d, since then production has been decreasing and has stood at 
around 863,000 b/d as of 2012, and 848.000 b/d in 2014, according to BP statistics.   
Turkey’s historically strong ties with Azerbaijan have further strengthened close 
bilateral energy relations which led, in the 1990’s, to the idea of transporting Azeri 
crude oil to Turkey. When Azerbaijan was seeking an opportunity to leave Moscow’s 
orbit and orient itself towards the West, the realization of BTC pipeline in 2006 formed 
a backbone for initial cooperation. The BTC has proven to be a successful part of the 
east-west energy corridor. In parallel to the BTC oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum 
(BTE) gas pipeline was constructed in 2007. The BTE pipeline, as Kardaş points out, 
“not only allowed Turkey to have access to cheaper gas, but also equipped Ankara with 
a hedge against Moscow and Tehran”.54 Thanks to the development of Stage I of the 
Shah Deniz project, Azerbaijan has started to export gas to Turkey via Georgia through 
the South Caucasus Pipeline. Additionally, the development of the Shah Deniz II 
project will boost Azeri gas volume and it is estimated that production is likely to be 
doubled in the coming years.55With another 1841 km long gas pipeline project, the 
TANAP will be carrying a total of 16 bcm of gas, of which 6bcm will be used by 
Turkey’s domestic consumers and the rest, 10bcm, will be transported to the EU gas 
market through the TAP project. 56  Although insignificant in terms of volume, 
Azerbaijan has granted Turkey the right to re-export 1 bcm of Azeri gas limited to 
Greece, meaning that other than Greece, Turkey cannot use the given the re-exportation 
right to sell to third countries that might be in dire need of gas during peak times.   
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The Shah Deniz field will be important in diversifying EU supply sources and will 
remain an important part of the Southern Gas Corridor project, but, given the volume of 
the gas that will be transported, it can be claimed that it is not going to be a major game-
changer. Due to political turmoil and uncertainty in the Middle Eastern sources; 
however, and the lack of desire from the Turkmen administration to bring Trans 
Caspian pipeline online, the Shah Deniz Stage II project has become a cornerstone and 
the “enabler” of the Southern Gas Corridor.57 To an increasing extent, Azerbaijan has 
played a critical role in the Southern Gas Corridor by introducing new projects and 
working with international energy companies and thus creating an environment for 
Turkey to achieve its target of becoming an energy hub in the region. Consequently, 
other sources in the Middle East and Caspian region have to be deployed to strengthen 
the Southern Gas Corridor project and provide an alternative project to hedge against 
Russia’s dominance in the EU gas market. In this regard, Turkey has to take a more 
proactive role in bringing other significant energy projects to the table in order to 
benefit from its central role as an energy bridge and to increase its potential to become a 
hub for both energy supplier and consumer countries.  
Iraq 
Although proven gas reserves in Iraq vary in volume according to different institutions, 
namely IEA and U.S. Energy Information Administration, Iraq is still considered one of 
the largest holders of natural gas and oil, with a volume of 3.6tcf of gas and 150bn of 
crude oil.58 Almost two-thirds of the reserves remain in the southern part of the country 
while the rest of the resources lie in the North of the country, in the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region. Since these enormous untapped resources are conveniently located near 
Turkey, Turkish energy companies have been working in the exploration of Iraqi gas 
and oil for over a decade and Turkey’s friendly relations with the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) have reached an all time high. Turkey’s first oil pipeline with Iraq 
has been operating since 1973; nonetheless on many occasions there have been attacks 
on the pipeline infrastructure.   
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In 2009, former Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri el-Maliki, stated that Iraq could supply 
the Nabucco pipeline with 15 bcm of gas. This created the hope that the Southern Gas 
Corridor through Iraq could potentially supply the EU gas market. However, there has 
been almost no progress towards this goal. Degeneration of domestic electricity 
infrastructure and disagreement over how to share the energy revenues has damaged the 
relationship between Baghdad and the KRG, by which Turkey has been adversely 
affected.59 Since then, further friction between the parties has been on the rise.  
Traditionally, the Turkish government preferred to sign contracts with the central 
government of Iraq. However, in recent years, due to the fissure between Ankara and 
Baghdad, Turkey has shown more inclination towards deepening energy ties with the 
KRG that would bolster Ankara’s desire to become a gas hub in the region, which has 
further enflamed the rivalry. To further elaborate, in one of the international energy 
conferences that took place in Erbil, former Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation 
manager Palaz asserted “ Turkey was eager to purchase northern Iraqi gas for export to 
Europe”.60 Nevertheless, Baghdad has thwarted Turkey’s attempt to enhance energy co-
operation with the KRG and even prevented the Energy Minister of Turkey to land at 
Erbil airport in an attempt to block further cooperation between Ankara and Erbil. In 
this regard, Turkey has to employ a pro-active foreign policy and undertake a 
constructive mediation role to ease tensions. It is clear that neither Turkey nor Iraq will 
be benefitting from internal rivalry and instability. By contrast, Turkey’s mediating role 
would boost the role that Iraq can play in the Southern Gas Corridor on condition that 
political order improves in Iraq. 
The Eastern Mediterranean: The Republic of Cyrus and Israel 
In 2011, Texas-based Noble Energy announced that the volume of untapped reserves in 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus could reach up to 5 to 8 trillion cubic meters, 
which could easily put the region in the top ranks of the largest gas reserves category.61 
Turkey’s coastal town Ceyhan could potentially be a promising energy corridor, 
through which Cypriot gas can be delivered to the EU gas market given the close 
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proximity of the reserves. Nevertheless, considering the political dispute that divides the 
north and south, the potential to become one of the major gas suppliers of the Southern 
Gas Corridor project has been undermined and it is unlikely that there will be any 
resolution to the dispute any time soon. Turkey has remained the only country that 
recognizes Northern Cyprus as a legally separate entity and independent state. 
Conversely, the Republic of Cyrus continues to claim that the country “represents the 
people of Cyprus as a whole, including Turkish Cypriots”.62 For Greek Cypriots, among 
all the other options, the most financially feasible and economically viable option for 
bringing its gas to the lucrative European market remains the construction of a short 
pipeline through Turkey. The former Energy Minister of Turkey, Taner Yıldız, 
remarked on the potential project by saying, “a pipeline that would carry Cypriot gas to 
Europe via Turkey could be built, just like the way we carry water to Cyprus with 
pipelines”.63 However, unless Turkey resolves the dispute with the Republic of Cyprus 
through diplomatic channels, the potential for Cyprus to become one of the suppliers of 
the Southern Gas Corridor will be shelved for an unknown period of time.  
As one of the potential newcomers to the Caspian “Great Game,” Israel, with the newly 
discovered Leviathan (535bcm) and Tamar (285bcm) fields is promising supply sources 
of gas with these discoveries likely to prove a game-changer in the Southern Gas 
Corridor project. Owing to the revolution in Egypt, Israel was about to face severe gas 
shortages that were unanticipated before the newly found untapped gas reserves 
offshore in the Eastern Mediterranean. This timely discovery has facilitated Israel’s 
energy supply security in times of very high fuel costs.  
The relationship between Turkey and Israel after the Mavi Marmara incident has 
deteriorated to the lowest point in recent history. As a result, Israel and the Republic of 
Cyrus have inked a maritime border agreement with the aim of finding an alternative 
route to Turkey in terms of gas transportation. Despite all the conflicting views with 
Turkey, for Israel, Ceyhan still appears to be the most commercially sound option 
through which gas can be transported to Europe through its existing infrastructure. In 
other words, given Israel’s financial strengths and capacity to access capital, 
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transportation of their additional gas through existing Ceyhan pipelines to EU is the 
most viable option for both parties. 
Overall, energy co-operation would be a constructive catalyst for reconciling Turkey 
and Israel. Furthermore, trilateral co-operation between Turkey-Israel and Cyprus, as 
improbable as it may sound, would promote a secure energy source for the region and 
for Europe, as well as strengthen Turkey’s hand in the Southern Gas Corridor as a major 
energy corridor country. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE REQUIREMENTS NEEDED FOR AN ENERGY HUB 
Turkey’s Ambition To Be An Energy Hub: Risks And Benefits 
The designation of Turkey as an “energy corridor” and “energy hub” has been 
extensively debated in the literature over the years. What makes a country a hub or a 
corridor, however, remains ambiguous particularly since these two concepts have been 
used interchangeably in the literature. There needs to be a clear definition for what truly 
makes a city or a country a corridor or an energy hub. Therefore, distinguishing the 
differences between an energy ‘transit or corridor state’ and an ‘energy hub’ carries the 
utmost importance to better define the role a country can play regarding the energy 
arena in the region. For example, although some scholars such as Bilgin (2011)64notes 
that having the right of re-export is part of the requirement for an energy hub, for others, 
such as Winrow (2011),65 the right of re-export to third countries is perceived as an 
attribute of a transit state, which creates the impression that the subject is still open to 
discussion among academics and with no clear framework as yet defined. 
 
Figure 9: Turkey as a Gas Transit/ Corridor/ Hub Center? 
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Countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as Greece, Bulgaria and Italy envisage 
their position as ‘the hub of Europe’. For instance, a pipeline that will serve as an 
interconnector between Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) created the idea in the eyes of the 
Greek government that Greece will be serving as a potential gas hub, which, as a multi-
sourced gas import project, will carry 15 bcm of gas to the EU market, serving the EU’s 
diversification policy by securing supply sources from Caspian countries and the 
Eastern Mediterranean.66 Additionally, the role of Greece is expected to be strengthened 
once the TAP pipeline project is realized and connected to the TANAP, which would 
serve as a route for Azerbaijani gas to reach the European gas hub at Baumgarten, 
Austria. Additionally, the transport of liquefied gas to the gas market through 
regasification terminals is another reason why the Greek government has claimed that 
Greece is becoming a gas hub for the EU. 
In another case, Bulgaria expects to have interconnectors with Greece and Romania, 
and has been receiving natural gas from Russia and transporting it to the Turkish gas 
market. This along with ongoing short-term storage facility construction near the 
Bulgarian-Turkish border has to a certain extent created a level of justification for being 
defined as a gas hub. It can still be argued, however, that the Bulgarian government’s 
claim that they have become “the gas hub of Eastern and Central Europe”67  is 
questionable, given that some of the prerequisite requirements for being a genuine gas 
hub remain unfulfilled.  
The realization of the TAP and TANAP project may contribute to the development of 
another gas transportation hub in Southern Europe by allowing countries such as Italy to 
reach energy consumers in the region such as Switzerland, which would further extend 
the number of countries that receive gas from TAP. Italy also imports gas both from 
Algeria and Libya— currently on hold— and re-exports it to the Austrian market.  
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Figure 10: ITGI Pipeline 
: 
 
Source: Edison 
 
In order to reach final energy consumers in different parts of the world, energy 
producing countries might need to utilize infrastructure, which crosses from one state to 
another. When ‘energy transit states’ are passed through to reach a final destination, the 
energy producing country have to pay transit fees as compensation, but might offer 
discounts in its overall energy fees. Gareth Winrow describes these as “good transit 
states,” whereas a transit country may not fulfil the requirements previously signed 
contracts by “break[-ing] agreements to demand higher transit fees or press for energy 
to be supplied at a discount price and they may illegally tap into hydrocarbons crossing 
their territory”68, which he has dubbed ‘bad transit states’.  
All these developments in the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe have 
contributed to the process of becoming an energy hub.  A carefully constructed 
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framework for being designated a hub, as well as the benefits it would bring, therefore, 
should be explained to better grasp the ambition to become an energy hub.  
In the following, a comprehensive overview of an energy hub will be elaborated upon, 
and the infrastructural, commercial and political complications that hinder Turkey’s 
progress towards becoming an energy trading hub will be analyzed. 
The term ‘hub’ is defined as “the central and most important part of an area, system, 
activity etc., which all the other parts are connected to”.69 A energy trading hub in its 
most basic definition can be described as, “a place where energy is bought and sold” 
and in terms of the benefits, “ a hub offers the possibility to do financial trading on one 
side and physical trading on the other; this includes storage, LNG, and pipelines”.70  
The basic requirements for a country to be considered an energy hub are clearly 
described by Iseri et al. as “a central market place where […] pipelines, storage 
facilities, refineries, terminals, petrochemical units and other energy related businesses 
may be located which offer jobs and boost the local economy” 71. Although operational 
pipelines have contributed to the Turkish economy through transit fees and job creation, 
according to Iseri’s definition Turkey does not really have sufficient storage facilities, 
terminals and units that would allow it to be identified as a major energy hub country. 
Given the current state of affairs, it is more suitable to describe Turkey as an energy 
transit country. 
The Institutional Constraints Against Turkey Becoming An Energy Hub 
The Regulatory Bottleneck In The Turkish Gas Market: BOTAS & EMRA 
To utilize its unique geographic position and to establish a natural gas hub in the region, 
Turkey needs to take measures to improve its status, to move further away from being 
an energy transit corridor towards becoming an energy hub. First of all, among all the 
other measures, the regulatory environment is a major hindrance that stands against 
Turkey’s ambition to be an energy hub. Until 2001, the gas market was controlled by 
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the Petroleum Pipeline Cooperation (BOTAŞ). As a vertically integrated company, 
BOTAŞ has dominated the market structure and been responsible for a variety of 
operations such as: transmission, importation, wholesale as well as gas storage and 
lastly, LNG operation. Since the enactment of law 4646 in 2001, private companies 
have been allowed to import gas, which encouraged market liberalization. Currently, 
however, only seven private companies import natural gas, accounting for twenty 
percent of overall consumption, and the remaining eighty per cent of natural gas sales to 
the end user is still controlled by the BOTAS. These seven companies import capacity 
was equal to 10 bcm in 2015, while the volume for BOTAŞ was above 30 bcm, which 
could be interpreted as indicating that the import volume of private companies is 
nowhere close to BOTAŞ’s capacity which has created unfair competition among the 
stakeholders.72 Currently, no clear timeframe has yet been identified for exactly when 
market liberalization requirements would be fulfilled by the government. The fact that 
BOTAŞ determines the reference price of gas and is controlled by the public authority, 
Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), it leaves no doubt that significant steps 
need to be taken in regard to transparency, which would demonstrate Turkey’s sincerity 
in opening its gas market to fair competition. Although the establishment of EMRA has 
brought somewhat new developments to the regulatory environment, especially to the 
secondary legislation, criticism over political influence in the decision making process 
has cast light on the importance of preserving the impartiality of institutions for 
effective and sophisticated market conditions. 73 
In defining the main problems in the regulatory framework and the current state of 
BOTAŞ, as Roberts notes, “should the Turkish gas market evolve into an open market, 
in which suppliers were free to strike their own deals with consumers, then, indeed, 
Turkey would become a true hub”.74 These characteristics demonstrate the very nature 
of the monopolistic gas market structure in Turkey where prices are not settled 
according to the principles of supply and demand but rather implemented weakly based 
on the likely benefits to the monopoly. Due to the heavy control of the policy makers 
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improved market conditions will not be realized in the years ahead as long as the 
current methods remain unchanged.75  
In comparing the prices publicized by BOTAŞ and Western European hub prices, it can 
be inferred that consumers in Turkey paid around fifteen to twenty percent more, which, 
again, raises the vitality of gas-to-gas competition and market liberalization. Therefore, 
once the long-planned liberalization of the Turkish gas market is implemented, in line 
with the development of free pricing and gas-to-gas competition, many more players 
would be able to join the gas market, resulting in lower prices.  
The Utilization of the Italian Model in the Turkish Gas Market Structure  
One prominent example of market liberalization which BOTAŞ could follow would be 
one already initiated successfully in Italy, whereby it would hold responsibility for 
external supply, while the internal market would be left in the hands of different gas 
providers. According to Zaimler, the process of changing hands in the gas industry 
would require approximately ten years on the condition that “gas companies in the 
domestic market have to have greater independence from the gas supplier”.76 As yet the 
monopolistic structure of BOTAŞ has created a situation in which no price can be 
determined by other smaller suppliers, preventing competition in gas pricing. Therefore, 
a major overhaul in the field of regulation needs to be implemented, starting with the 
lowering of BOTAŞ’ approximately 80% of market share.  
It should also be noted that the gas market can only be liberalized and became 
transparent and competitive when BOTAŞ is unbundled into four bodies of import, 
transmission, storage and sales as was envisaged by the natural gas law, 4646.77 Once 
the issue of unbundling is completed the currently established competition structure and 
access to the gas market by private companies will be significantly improved, paving 
the way for a better prepared energy market for Turkey that would ease its transition 
from being a corridor to a genuine energy hub. The issue of unbundling of BOTAŞ 
should have been completed years befor but there has still not been any significant step  
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taken towards this long-planned gas market structure. Therefore, the model that has 
been used in Italy could be recommended as one of the most promising alternatives that  
could potentially work well for the Turkish gas market structure.   
Inadequate Gas Storage and Physical Infrastructure 
A second area in which Turkey needs to work toward change is the improvement of gas 
storage and other physical infrastructure, such as pipeline networking. Almost ninety-
eight per cent (source) of natural gas consumed in Turkey is imported, making Turkey 
heavily reliant on the gas exporting countries of Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Nigeria and 
lastly Algeria. During the cold winter period, Turkey needs an extra volume of gas to 
meet demand at peak times, creating the problem of security of supply due to the lack of 
infrastructure and enough storage facility. Specifically in November 2015, the 
escalation of tensions between Russia and Turkey due the downed Russian jet, once 
again, has raised the question of whether Turkey can cope with the challenges of gas 
interruption that might stem from political conflict or any other technical problem. 
Turkey has two main operational gas storage facilities, one of which is in Silivri and 
owned by Turkish Petroleum. It is in the northwestern part of Marmara region, with a 
capacity of 2.67 bcm and a withdrawal rate of 20 million cubic meters (MCM) of 
capacity, way below the necessary level to change Turkey’s current energy bridge or 
corridor status into that of a hub. The expansion of the current capacity withdrawal to 
30 mcm is planned for 2017. The second gas storage facility is in the province of 
Aksaray- Sultanhanı with a total volume of 1.5 bcm, which is owned by BOTAŞ. 
Although it is not yet operational, in the province of Central Anotolia, another project is 
underway in Tuz Gölü, which is projected to provide a capacity of 480 mcm once 
completed.78 The Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources also has plans to 
invest in extra storage capacity to increase Turkey’s resilience, at least to a degree of ten 
per cent in excess of domestic consumption in the years ahead.  
Considering the LNG storage facilities, a private Turkish company Egegaz owns a 
capacity of 5.5 bcm in Izmir, on the West part of Turkey. The significance of the 
relative lack of storage capacity for the domestic energy security, however, cannot be 
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denied, considering the strategic implications of gas shortages nationwide in times of 
major crises. The role that this facility would play is likely to remain minor since the 
plant is unconnected to the infrastructure that would serve the whole country. For this 
reason, additional capacity that is evenly spread geographically, and well-connected to 
the national networks, is required to better supply the country as a whole. 
In 2015, the second biggest growth rate of natural gas consumption after China was that 
of Turkey, making Turkey vulnerable to internal as well as external energy shocks. 
Countries such as Ukraine with 34 bcm of storage capacity, Italy 16 bcm, the 
Netherlands and Germany 10 and 24 bcm, respectively, while the storage facilities in 
Turkey lag behind these countries which consume similar volumes of gas. Concerning 
the benefits provided by underground storage facilities, Tim Boersma, fellow and acting 
director of the Brookings Institution's Energy Security and Climate Initiative, notes "It 
provides flexibility, and can be commercially interesting, provided there is enough 
variation between seasonal gas prices”.79 Given the capacity of the gas storage facilities 
currently operational in Turkey, it can be suggested that the country is nowhere near 
meeting the demands of a country that consumed approximately 50 bcm of gas in 2015.  
The Ukrainian ambassador to Turkey, Sergiy Korsunsky, has recently come up with a 
proposal to strengthen relations with Turkey for whom spare gas storage capacity can 
be made available, suggesting that "We guarantee that whatever you put in you will 
receive it back whenever you need it. We have a spare capacity of at least 17-18 bcm. 
We recommended to BOTAŞ that Turkey can put approximately 17-18 bcm of gas into 
storage. Then, if market conditions are favorable, Turkey can sell it to Europe. If it’s 
unfavorable, you can consume it or keep it”.80 In an interview with the state news 
agency, the Anadolu, he further elaborated on the challenges that Turkey would likely 
face in the near-term by noting, “It would be good if you have bigger storage. 
Unfortunately, Turkey does not have this geology on its territory. I think this is a 
problem and that is why we are working with Turkey to allow Turkish companies to use 
our storage in Western Ukraine. We don’t have a deal yet but Ukraine’s Naftogaz and 
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Turkish BOTAŞ are holding discussions".81 Presently, Turkey’s storage capacity can 
only meet five per cent of its gas consumption. Although, the Ukrainian Ambassador’s 
proposal might meet Turkey’s current need in the short-term, from the energy security 
point of view Turkey should be aiming to have around 10 bcm of storage capacity in the 
middle term. 
Besides the problem of inadequate storage capacity, price fluctuations as well as 
changes in seasonal demand have also put a strain on Turkey to the extent that the 
construction of additional gas pipelines has become one of the prerequisites for meeting 
these and other similar unpredictable challenges. A high-pressure natural gas 
transmission network that has been established in Turkey with a length of 15,000 
kilometers is far smaller than many of the world’s biggest gas consuming economies. 
For instance, the U.S. has a 850,000 kilometer-long pipeline network, and the state of 
Texas, which has a similar land area to Turkey, has above 50,000 kilometers of pipeline 
infrastructure 82 , which clearly demonstrates that Turkey’s pipeline network 
infrastructure is inadequate for a country of its size, and represents a hindrance to 
Turkey realizing its full economic potential.  
Securing gas supply in peak times and in times of gas disruption requires advanced 
storage facilities. It should also be noted that for a country pursuing the goal of 
becoming a hub also necessitates spare capacity in which energy-consuming countries 
can trust. Unless Turkey constructs storage facilities along with extensive additional 
pipelines, which Turkey would use instead of Russian pipelines, the lack of these 
improvements would remain impediments that would shelve Turkey’s goal of becoming 
an energy hub. It has been suggested, however, that one possible remedy to this 
problem in the short term is to recognize that because the storage facilities in Turkey 
belong to the state and continue to be run by the state, to overcome the capacity 
shortages and increase the overall resilience of the Turkish gas market, private 
companies should be encouraged to take part in building new facilities.83 
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The Constraint Brought about by Gas Contract Agreements and of Re-
Exportation: 
Thirdly, due to the nature of conventional natural gas agreements, which have been 
based on long-term, oil indexed and take-or-pay terms, Turkey has also been forced to 
pay for gas, which it has not consumed. This contradicts the energy hub requirement of 
being “a place where energy is bought and sold”.84 Additionally, Turkey has to have the 
right to re-export gas under any circumstances. In reality, however, Turkey has no rights 
in this regard with the exception of the gas contracts agreed with Azerbaijan. One 
limitation to this arrangement is that this contract stipulates that Turkey can only re-
export gas to Greece at a maximum of 750 mcm. The main reason why Turkey has not 
been able to secure more significant re-export rights is related to the fact that energy 
producer countries, namely Russia and Iran, do not like the fact that Turkey could profit 
from gas which originates from their territories. 85  
Overall, being an energy hub has numerous necessary preconditions that must be 
fulfilled. Turkey, therefore, has to secure the right to re-export gas and build bigger 
storage facilities and terminals, establish a more transparent gas transit regime, bring 
about a functioning competitive gas market, liberalize the gas market and develop a 
strong infrastructure in order to lay the foundation for the establishment of a genuine 
energy hub. 
In addition to these preconditions, some other conditions might be met to strengthen 
Turkey’s hand in achieving its ambition to become a hub. Firstly, the weight of gas-to-
gas competition should be internalized. Secondly, a transition towards flexible and 
dynamic market contracts, varying from short-term to spots and hub pricing, should be 
integrated and supported with a new legal and regulatory framework. Thirdly, a greater 
volume of LNG should be facilitated and integrated into the system to balance the risks 
associated with pipeline-based gas. 
Once Turkey overcomes these major hurdles and becomes a genuine energy trading hub 
in the region, it would be able to take a more influential role in regional energy 
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geopolitics and its international standing will also be enhanced and strengthened, which 
eventually would contribute to the overall energy security of both Turkey and the EU.  
As long as Turkey fails to reduce its dependency on Russian natural gas, liberalize its 
natural gas market, build better storage facilities and increase its funding for building 
transfer units, its hopes of becoming a physical energy hub country will not be realized.  
Turkey’s successful advancement to the status of gas hub can only be realized with a 
deregulated gas market created on the premise of a transparent gas market structure 
along with broad liquidity and flexibility as well as based on a solid market culture and 
committed political will. Additionally, multiple gas supplies, with the help of larger 
financial players, and the provision of non-discriminatory access to gas storage would 
help to elevate Turkey’s current status as energy corridor to that of an energy hub. 
Implications of the EFET’s Gas Hub Development Study for Turkey: Strengths 
and Weaknesses 
The study undertaken by the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) in 2014, 
which was the one of the first of its kind, has shed light on the ambiguous framework of 
the energy hub, corridor and energy center concepts by developing a model based on the 
experiences of EFET members. This regards identifying what makes a country an 
energy hub by providing individual assessments, guidelines and recommendations with 
an aim of supporting the development of gas hubs in the EU.86 With this initiative, 
Transmission System Operators (TSO’s) and National Regulatory Authorities (NRA’s) 
will have the chance to look at the weaknesses and strengths of their position in 
comparison to all other hub candidates and thereby would be able to make an effort to 
create more balanced market conditions. The European Federation of Energy Traders 
states that their study has not yet been completed and they will “continue to work on 
other market-opening measures in addition to hub design”.87 The ambitious model is 
intended to inspire the creation of a virtual trading point, which later on would turn into 
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a benchmark for existing hubs and new comers, creating a baseline for “new hubs 
[attempting] to reinvent services to market.”88 
The European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) has been assessing the ranking of 
many countries out of twenty conditions comprising of regulatory, TSO as well as 
market conditions with a study called “European Gas Hub Development Study 
(EGHDS)”. According to the EGHDS’ study of 2015, the score for Turkey out of 
twenty was only 5.5,89 which meant that Turkey is far from fulfilling the requirements 
of an energy hub. In the following table, requirements that need to be met for an energy 
hub are scored in different categories in which regulatory rules are equal to six points, 
TSO is seven and the other seven marks are given for the best market conditions. 
Figure 11: NBP-Score 20 
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Figure 12: Turkey-EFET 
 
 
The conditions presented in the table above show the details of Turkey’s overall score 
of 5.5. Turkey was successful in establishing a consultation mechanism, which is named 
Petform and working in conjunction with The European Federation of Energy Traders 
(EFET). Regarding the role of hub operator, which is run in Turkey by BOTAŞ, Turkey 
got only a half point out of two meaning that there is a room for growth for this 
requirement. Additionally, both for standardized contracts and PRA’s at the hub, 
Turkey met only 50% of the requirements for each. These also have to be evaluated and 
improved.90 On account of the other numerous conditions mentioned in the EFET’s list, 
for which Turkey scored zero are shortcomings which cause the country to lose 14,5 
points out of a potential total of 20. This should be interpreted to mean that progress 
towards a liquid trading hub is still a distant goal for Turkey. Clearly if Turkey wishes 
to take full advantage of its potential, it would need to be more conscientious in 
addressing its shortcomings.    
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A useful comparison would be one of the best-scoring countries, Austria, the 
achievements of which can be viewed in the following table. 
Figure 13: Austria-EFET 
 
 
 
Major Energy Hub Cities in Europe: What Rotterdam & Baumgarten Offer As 
Major Gas Trading Hubs  
Offering an excellent location for international gas trading along with its state of the art 
infrastructure and numerous gas supply routes, Baumgarten in Austria has been a 
unique connection point between liquid and illiquid markets. The Central European Gas 
Hub in Baumgarten, established in 2005, has been serving as one of the largest stations 
in Central Europe.91  With its 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) of high storage capacity 
within a 400 km radius it assures high flexibility as well as supply security for Central 
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European gas consumers.92 What makes Baumgarten so different is related to the 
interconnection point where the gas hub receives gas from various sources and these 
supplies are re-routed to other gas consuming countries via a number of pipeline 
systems covering various regions. Moreover, the facilities at the Baumgarten gas hub 
are able to receive, meter, as well as test and compress natural gas at the station. 
As one of the most advanced dispatch centers and with its transmission and distribution 
system operators, it can be viewed in the figure 9, Baumgarten handles great volumes of 
gas for various countries such as Italy, Slovenia and Croatia through the Trans-Austria 
Gasleitung (TAG) pipeline and Süd-Ost-Leitung (SOL) pipeline to Hungary through the 
Hungaria-Austria-Gasleitung (HAG) pipeline, to Slovakia through the March-
Baumgarten-Gasleitung pipeline and lastly, to Germany and France through the West-
Austria-Gasleitung (WAG) and the Penta-West Pipeline (PW).93 
 
Figure 14: Baumgarten Hub 
 
The continuous flow of gas supplied mainly by Russia, Norway as well as from other 
countries arrive at the Baumgarten Hub and from there are directed through the 
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aforementioned pipelines transiting to the various destinations in Hungary, Slovenia, 
Germany and Italy with a total length of approximately 2.000 kilometers of 
underground and undersea pipelines.94  
According to the statistics given by the Austrian OMV, a volume of approximately 46 
bcm of natural gas was transported through these pipelines in 2014 and increased to 
around 57 bcm  in 2015.95 According to OMV Gas & Power, currently over a hundred 
million cubic meters of gas is being transported through Baumgarten every day. Almost 
one-third of gas imported to the Baumgarten gas station is from Russia, only one-sixth 
of which is retained for domestic consumption.  According to the BP Statistical Review 
of World Energy 2015, Austria consumed around 7.9 bcm of gas in 2014, while 
exported 46 bcm. 96  Clearly these figures demonstrate what can be considered a 
benchmark for a successfully operating modern gas hub. Ceyhan, which is, among other 
stations, currently handling only for domestic consumption, would do well to emulate 
this increase in volume to rise to gas hub status.  
Since 2012, after meticulous upgrading, Baumgarten, once a physical point only, has 
become a virtual trading point, a new system that has brought more liquidity. This 
means that competition is stimulated among newcomers to the gas market with the aim 
of providing better prices for end users.97 Overall, an energy hub operating as a virtual 
trading point has the following characteristics: implementation of market-based pricing, 
free access to the market for all participants, and an effectively functioning trading 
system that fosters hub-to-hub trading. 
European Hub for Oil and Gas: Rotterdam 
Rotterdam, as a European hub for production distribution and arrival point and one of 
the largest industrial as well as logistic clusters, guarantees all source of energy 
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commodities to come together. As a European gateway for oil and gas transition, 
Rotterdam provides a perfect location with its economy of scale and reliable services. 
Thanks to the half-century experience of well-developed knowledge in the sector, 
Rotterdam has laid a foundation for game changing innovations and research & 
development in the gas and oil sector.  
 The total length of transmission network in Netherlands is around 12.050 kilometers 
and overall gas storage capacities reaching at 13.3 bcm as of 2015. Gas storage facilities 
are distributed in different parts of the country in places like Norg, Alkmar, Epe, 
Bergermeer, Grijpskerk. 
According to the figures provided in 2015 by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
of Energy Market Directorate, the total volume of export reached at 58 bcm.98 While the 
Netherlands consumed 31.8 bcm of gas, produced 43 bcm as of 2015, according to the 
BP statistical review of world energy 201699.    
The Netherlands has been one of the key gas producers and the main distribution center 
for the Northwestern Europe for the last fifty years. Although, it is estimated that the 
production in one of the major gas production fields in Netherlands’ Groningen field is 
set to continue in decades to come, the total production has been declining. Apart from 
Groningen field, numerous other offshore and onshore gas fields contribute to the 
overall gas production. According to the projection figured out by the Dutch Energy 
Market Directorate, the overall production in 2020 is expected to be 39 bcm while this 
number precipitates in volume to 26 bcm by 2025 reaching at total volume of 12 bcm in 
2030.100 However, it should be noted that having large volume of gas reserves is not a 
requirement for an energy hub but rather great volume of gas that would flow to the hub 
center is a vital component, which has been the case for Baumgarten.  
With its liberalized market and the number of players actively in the gas sector, high 
transmission network supported with underground storage reservoirs, and having the 
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largest Title Transfer Facility (TFF) and well functioning APX-Endex gas exchange, 
Rotterdam provides optimum ground for an energy hub.101 As a well-established gas-
trading hub, Rotterdam is linked to the global gas market and operates as a producer, 
and trader. Currently, many of the gas consumer countries in Northwestern Europe has 
been benefiting from TTF as a virtual trading hub and a benchmark that allows gas to be 
transferred to another party, which outpaces other trading centers. The system ensures 
the balance between supply and demand, and buyers can take delivery at anytime while 
vendor can supply gas any point to the network. Advanced level of networking and 
transfer facilities is a must to provide safe and secure supply to the end user.  
Additionally, the establishment of secure, transparent electronic trading environment 
that allows energy exchanges has necessitated the need in this field, which has fulfilled 
by forming APX-Endex serving as spot and future market for energy exchanges. The 
establishment of APX-Endex has contributed to the integration of gas market in the EU. 
Virtual trading point created through APX-Endex and TFF as benchmarks of a gas 
trading hub should be benefitted and similar system operator should be established in 
Ceyhan port for integrated, consolidated energy exchanges. Therefore, the facilitation of 
development of integrated and liberalized gas market that ensures the balance between 
supply and demand and functions in line with other major gas hubs in Europe would 
help Ceyhan port to elevate its position from solely serving a transit point where gas 
and oil transported.   
  
                                                
101 The Dutch Gas Hub, Publication of Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Netherland, P.25, 26 
  48 
CHAPTER 3 
TURKEY’S ABILITY TO CREATE SPARE CAPACITY TO OFFER AN 
ALTERNATIVE OPTION FOR THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET 
The Evolution Of The Natural Gas Market In Turkey 
In 1976, the very first natural gas reserves were discovered in the province of Kırklareli. 
Due to electricity shortages and in order to meet the increasing energy demand, Turkey 
considered alternative energy sources, one of which was natural gas. Since then, overall 
consumption has increased not only for industrial and household consumption but also 
for natural gas utilized for electricity generation. Although energy relations between the 
European countries and the USSR date back to 1960, it was only in the 1980’s that 
Turkey decided to benefit from such a valuable commodity.  Subsequently a 
memorandum of understanding between Turkey and USSR was signed in 1984 to 
import natural gas. By the year 1986, an agreement covering twenty-five years was 
signed between BOTAŞ and Soyuzgazexport, which carries the gas through a 842 
kilometer-long pipeline named the Russia-Turkey West Pipeline. Turkey also signed an 
agreement to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) and natural gas from Algeria through 
marine transportation in 1986. By 1988 Ankara was the first city whose residents were 
able to use natural gas in their homes; this was later introduced in Istanbul and Bursa in 
1992. With an aim of creating a framework for the natural gas sector which would 
prove competitive and encourage a transparent market structure, law no:  4646 was 
enacted in 2001. 102 Considering the overall energy mixture of Turkey in the generation 
of electricity, natural gas is the “most used fuel type”, followed by coal, hydropower 
and oil. 103  
The analysis in this section will be based on current discoveries and potential 
improvements in the field of energy in the region that surrounds Turkey. Firstly, 
Turkey’s neighboring country, Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), will be 
closely analyzed in terms of perils and pitfalls that the country presently faces, 
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requirements will be elaborated on regarding the role that would likely play in Turkey’s 
energy future and how it would serve Turkey’s strategic ambition to become an energy 
hub. Secondly, the future of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Turkey will be examined 
and the main requirements which eventually would contribute to the understanding of 
the potential role that LNG can play in the medium and long-term in Turkey’s energy 
mixture will be demonstrated. The importance of Qatar as well as other newcomers to 
the LNG business will be detailed and the estimated spare capacity will be shown with 
the view that Turkey could serve as a potential energy hub country between energy 
producing and energy consuming countries. Thirdly, newly developed offshore gas 
fields surrounding the Mediterranean will be considered. Additionally, the spare 
capacity that Leviathan and Tamar would make available to Turkey and the EU gas 
market will be studied with the aim of grasping the prospects for Israel’s gas fields 
fulfilling Turkey’s ambition to create a regional natural gas hub. 
Why Turkey Is The Best Option for the KRG’s Oil Export Strategy 
As the world’s fifth and thirteenth biggest oil and natural gas reserve holders, Iraq’s 
potential to meet the increasing demand of the Asian market has become increasingly 
evident in recent years.104 Iraq has two major production centers, comprising the 
Northern, and Southern and Central fields, which constitute 21 percent and 79 percent 
of total oil production capacity, respectively.105 It is estimated by the IEA that the area 
that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) controls contains around four billion 
barrels of oil but the whole region still remains under-explored. While the KRG is in 
control of the Northern fields, the Southern and Central fields are under the control of 
the central government. This classification simply reflects the current geography and 
politics in Iraq and is not an argument for supporting the Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG) breaking away from Iraq.    
Given the fact that the production fields in Iraq are mainly land-locked, to expand Iraq’s 
oil output, exportation will require secure transnational pipelines. However, 
transnational pipelines carry various risks that have be taken into account, especially in 
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the face of the threat of Islamic State (IS) and the global oil supply glut that has resulted 
in a collapse in oil prices.106 Therefore, the limitations that the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) faces due to the happenstance of its geography could be overcome 
by mutually beneficial commercial ties with Turkey, which would strengthen relations 
between the parties and potentially secure the KRG’s capacity to transport oil to the 
world market. 
One might suggest that the KRG has to diversify its export routes in order to seek an 
alternative option so as not to be heavily dependent on a particular source. Given the 
current geography of the area controlled by the KRG, options that are available are for 
the KRG to export its oil through Iran, Jordan and Syria.  
Constructing an oil pipeline between the KRG and Iran, because of its economic 
viability and geographic logic, is not feasible considering that the KRG’s primary oil 
market is Europe. Assuming that the pipeline is constructed from the KRG to Iran, 
exporting oil from the Persian Gulf to the potential Asian market requires shipment, 
which eventually would cost more than Mediterranean pipeline routes.107 Additionally, 
in recent years the relationship between the KRG and Iran has been uncooperative and 
is unlikely to recover to a credible energy relationship anytime soon. Apparently, the 
Iranian option is not on the table for the KRG’s administration. 
The ongoing conflict and constant threat of Islamic State has created the outcome that 
Syria is also an impossible partner in years ahead. Even before the Syrian war, despite 
the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) pipeline that passed through Syrian land in between 
1930’s to 1960’s proving to be a successful case in the region, in the years following 
Iraq’s heavy dependence on this pipeline it was used for political leverage by Syria over 
the Ba’ath regime of Iraq and subsequently resulted in the closure of the pipeline.108 
Presuming that even if Syria and Iraq end the terror of IS and settle the internal conflict 
in their home countries, the possibility of exporting Iraq’s Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) oil through Syria or even Jordan do not look like promising 
alternatives since tribal groups in the Western Anbar province of Iraq have attacked the 
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Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline hundreds of times. Therefore, a new pipeline on this route 
would not only suffer from exorbitantly high capital expenses of construction but would 
also likely be exposed to security threats.  
The most financially sound and physically secure option for the KRG’s oil and gas 
transportation routes for exporting its hydrocarbons is to construct a pipeline parallel to 
the Khurmala-Ceyhan pipeline with the same volume of Kirkuk-Ceyhan. By building a 
pipeline on this stated line, it will be a cost effective option given the elevation 
variability in the region as well as overall expenditure on protecting already existing 
pipeline. With this pipeline, the total volume of oil would reach 1.5 mbpd from a 
volume of 800.000 mbpd.109 Also expense of establishing security forces will be less 
costly since the new pipeline will be laid near the existing pipeline. In this regard, it can 
be claimed that Ankara would serve as an indispensible partner for Erbil, especially in 
comparison with other available partners for securely transporting its gas and oil to 
Europe or elsewhere through Mediterranean routes. Other than during the Gulf War and 
UN sanctions on Iraq’s government from 1990 to 1996, Turkey has never shut down the 
Kirkuk Ceyhan pipeline and has been a reliable partner. Even if the pipeline between 
the states is attacked or sabotaged by ISIS or any other terrorist organization, Turkey 
would act swiftly to repair and re-open it within a matter of days, which again serves to 
support the notion that Turkey still stands as the best available option for the region. On 
the 8th of May, despite Baghdad’s attempts to prevent oil and gas sales, a tanker 
carrying Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)’s oil embarked from the Turkish coastal 
town of Ceyhan, anchored in Trieste, and reached the European refineries through the 
Transalpine Pipeline.110 Turkey’s incumbent government has been having a tough time 
with the central government of Iraq for allowing the KRG to export oil through the 
Ceyhan pipeline; however, the KRG has put a great deal of effort in establishing an 
image of itself as “ Turkey’s buffer- and investor-friendly”111. Although Baghdad has 
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attempted to prevent the sale of the KRG’s oil and gas, it seems this approach is 
doomed to fail given the increasing need for energy both in the region and the world. 
Thanks to its abundant fossil fuel reserves, the KRG ‘s economy continues to expand, 
which will likely give the KRG’s administration the upper hand in dealing with the 
Central government.   
Once bitter and conflicting views between Turkey and the KRG started to change when 
the first Turkish premier visited and opened the International Airport in Erbil. This 
intensified relationship can be viewed as having been the result of natural gas “surg[-
ing] to the center of several geopolitical tussles taking place in and around the Middle 
East”.112 Especially considering Turkish and Kurdish historical mutual enmity both at 
home and in the region, this change has been suspiciously questioned: “one of the single 
most interesting shifts in today’s political climate is the transformation of Turkey’s 
relationship with Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government”.113  In 2010, the KRG’s 
influential energy minister Hawrami announced that the parties agreed on supplying the 
Turkish gas market with up to 60 bcm of natural gas starting from 2015 once details that 
were on the table were agreed upon. It can be claimed that by the year 2020, it is likely 
that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) would supply Turkey with up to 10 bcm 
of gas and it is also estimated that this volume would increase up to 27 to 30 bcm until 
2035 with the condition that ongoing long-running regional conflicts are resolved and 
investment conditions improve. 
With an estimated 2.8 to 5.7 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves114 above 
Norway’s overall gas reserves, the KRG insists on “market-based commercialization”115 
of its oil and gas. Since the enactment of oil and gas laws of the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq in 2007, despite the ongoing argument whether it is constitutional or not, and 
increasingly intensifying antagonism between the parties, as Pflüger rightly asserts, 
“energy almost always makes its way to where it is needed. National and ideological 
borders hardly play a role when it comes to international energy trade.”116 From the 
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perspective of Turkey, their policy orientation, at least recently, has consistently been 
that, “if there is no interference, Turkey won’t turn down its neighbor’s inexpensive 
oil”.117 
Given the KRG’s potential for supplying gas to Turkey, one third of Turkey’s currently 
consumed gas would be supplied by KRG in the years ahead as long as the required 
investment in infrastructure is delivered, its obsolete facilities are renewed and 
antagonism between Erbil and Baghdad are settled with the help of Ankara’s further 
strategic planning.118   
By 2020, total production of gas could reach to up to 12 bcm and in 2030 there is a very 
high probability that this volume could get to the level of 32 bcm.119 The KRG has 
planned to export gas from 2020 at the latest, starting with 10 bcm and reaching to 20 
bcm within a decade, which would be a relatively cost-competitive source of gas supply 
for the EU market, particularly given the fact that the importance of natural gas in the 
overall energy mix has increased from a marginal role to central stage in recent years, 
especially for electricity generation.120 Therefore, it can be claimed that gas will be 
replacing oil for power generation, freeing up oil resources for export. This trend would 
be a win-win solution for Iraq’s oil and gas sector problems by providing greater funds 
to the state budget that would be available for investment in the renovation of its 
crippling infrastructure.  
Due to the fight between Erbil and Baghdad, the Iraqi government has cut off the 
KRG’s budget, and the KRG has been constantly looking for ways to increase its 
revenue by exporting its petroleum products to the world oil market. That being the 
case, “Turkey holds all the leverage over Kurdistan; whereas it can import oil from 
global markets, Kurdistan’s economic survival relies upon accessing consumers via 
Turkey”121, as pointed out by Nicholas Borroz on the topic of the vitality of Turkey for 
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the future prospects of KRG’s economy. Natural gas consumption in the overall energy 
mix is set to increase in Turkey and it is estimated by the Turkish Ministry of Energy 
that in 2023 Turkey would need approximately 70 bcm of gas122, which clearly reveals 
the reason why Turkey has been proactive both commercially and diplomatically with 
KRG. With the cooperation of the KRG, Turkey would get spare capacity of 10 bcm in 
the short term once technical problems are resolved, with the prospect of this increasing 
to 20 bcm in the long term.  
The Role of LNG 
Since the first shipment of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Algeria to the UK market 
in 1964, the volume of LNG imported all around the world has increased substantially, 
reaching 241 million tons per annum as of 2014.123 Re-gasification capacity also surged 
to 202.7 bcm in 2014, according to the figure provided by the Group of LNG importers. 
As a result, the traditional pipeline based natural gas transportation has come under 
scrutiny with the introduction of this pioneering alternative, which has paved the way 
for a new method of natural gas transportation. The World LNG report points out that 
currently, nineteen countries export and twenty-nine countries import LNG.124 Since 
2000, overall growth in LNG has been seven percent and presently, the share of LNG in 
total natural gas consumption accounts for ten percent.  
Gas reserves in the world are not distributed evenly, therefore accessibility to pipeline 
systems is very limited due to geographic difficulties. For countries that have no 
prospect of getting connected to a pipeline system and are very far away from natural 
gas exporting countries, LNG offers greater flexibility in the transportation of gas. 
Secondly, it should also be noted that construction of transnational pipelines is a costly 
business, not to mention the physical security issues that arise from pipelines being an 
easy target in times of conflict between neighboring countries. For this reason, LNG 
offers greater security. Another point is that LNG offers an alternative by making it 
easier to diversify sources in the energy mix, which overall strengthens energy security. 
Lastly, in recent years, LNG has increasingly sold at spot markets which proves the fact 
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that LNG can benefit at any stage of the value chain and therefore, in times of gas 
shortages due to any unexpected circumstances, LNG would likely become the most 
promising alternative by creating plenty of room for manoeuvre.  
Since 1964, knowhow and specialization have accumulated in the LNG field. In the 
past, due to its relatively higher cost and price concerns, LNG had not drawn the 
attention of countries that were consuming natural gas. Due to production (liquefying 
the gas for shipment afterward at the terminal turning into gas form) and transportation 
difficulties and having linked to oil prices, LNG has been relatively costlier than 
pipeline based natural gas and, therefore, LNG has not been on top of the list of major 
gas importing countries of the world. However, in recent years price reforms in natural 
gas, especially in short term-spot market prices, has attracted a great deal of attention. 
Recent developments in the energy world have caused downward pressure on LNG 
prices, which have occurred due to several reasons.  Firstly, the shale boom in the U.S. 
has attributed to the creation of a gas glut; and this excessive supply of gas has resulted 
in lower prices at the Henry Hub spot gas market. Secondly, the collapse of oil prices 
for the last eighteen months, which hit as low as thirty USD on 12th January 2016125, has 
pushed overall LNG prices to a reasonable level since the majority of LNG contracts 
have been signed on the basis of  oil-indexed-long-term contracts. It should be expected 
that in the years ahead LNG is likely to become a matter of interest for various 
stakeholders. Countries such as Poland, Estonia and other Baltic states in the EU have 
invested in the construction of LNG terminals and other facilities as part of their energy 
diversification policy.   
Qatar’s Potential in Helping Turkey to Diversify Its Energy Mix Through LNG 
Qatar has the third largest volume of natural gas reserves after Russia and Iran and is 
one of the biggest LNG exporters in the world.  Qatar has 24.5 tcm of gas reserves, 
which is equal to 13.1% of world proven gas reserves.126 Given Russia’s total gas 
reserve of 32.3 tcm and its vast land, and considering Qatar’s far smaller territory and 
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the volume of gas that is available, the significance of its reserve can better be 
understood. 
As of 2015, Qatar produced 181.4 bcm of natural gas.127 The steady increase in the 
volume of gas produced, particularly for the last ten year period, has shown both 
increasing demand in gas as well as Qatar’s ability to meet the growing need for gas all 
around the world between 2003 to 2013. As can be seen in the figure below, although 
domestic consumption since 2003 has been considerably stable, the overall production, 
indicated in blue in the figure below, increased at a staggering rate. 
 
Figure 15: Qatar Gas Flows 
 
 In recent years Turkey has procured a volume of 1.2 bcm of LNG from Qatar through 
the spot market. In an interview with the Qatari ambassador to Turkey, Salem Mubarak 
Al-Shafi, he pointed out that Turkey and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) on the 2nd December 2015, agreeing on long-term LNG trade between the 
parties. Answering the question of Turkey’s potential importing capacity, the 
ambassador clearly stated that LNG export volume very much hinges on the technical 
capacities of both countries. 128 
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Turkey, in terms of both its price compatibility and energy security, should expand its 
overall LNG investments in the middle and long term. Given Turkey’s heavy reliance 
on Russia, which accounted for approximately 55%, Qatar stands as one of the most 
promising LNG suppliers among all the other LNG providing countries in helping 
Turkey to diversify its supply sources away from Russia. Although constructing a LNG 
terminal, especially in the short-run, is not an easy task and requires large amounts of 
capital, a progressive increase in the LNG cargo shipment as a percentage of the total 
volume of gas imported should be an a chief target. Therefore, lessons learned from 
major pioneering LNG terminals constructed in Spain, France and the UK should be 
examined and for the benefit of improving Turkish storage capacity.  
LNG’s Potential: Natural Gas Mixture in Turkey 
Turkey has two liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, one operated by BOTAŞ at 
Marmara Ereğli terminal and the other belonging to Egegaz and operated in İzmir 
Aliağa. As of 2014, Turkey imported 7.3 bcm of LNG from two major sources, namely: 
Nigeria, which has accounted for 1.2 bcm and the rest, 6.1 bcm, provided by Algeria. 
Given that Turkey consumed approximately 50 bcm of gas in 2015, 7.2 bcm of LNG 
has not been a substantial component in Turkey’s gas mixture and there is therefore 
room for growth in establishing a stronger LNG market. 
There is no logic for transferring gas from Qatar to Turkey with a pipeline due to 
regional security concerns; rather it can be suggested that importing gas in the form of 
LNG is the best option available. This choice is both economically feasible and 
physically viable for both parties on condition that Turkey builds up new LNG 
terminals and increases the volume of gas storage in the middle term and that Turkey 
clearly sees the benefit of improving its energy security through the diversification of 
gas sources.     
The benefits of increasing the volume of LNG for Turkey’s gas market 
1. Advantages of short term-spot market pricing, 
2. The overall cost of pipeline-based gas has increasingly closed the gap on the 
cost of short-term- spot market based prices. The gap between short-term 
contracts with oil-pegged long-term contracts has diminished, especially in 
times of low oil prices. This has allowed companies to benefit from spot market 
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pricing, once traded exclusively inflexible contracts, and altered the old pricing 
conventions. 129       
3. Transportation of LNG is dependent on shipment of natural gas, which makes 
much easier to import gas from variable sources in comparison with pipeline 
based transportation. The spot market offers greater flexibility both in terms of 
the prices and volume of gas needed for peak times especially in hard weather 
conditions. Additionally, it is expected that by 2020 the U.S. would be ready to 
provide a substantial volume of LNG to the world gas market, in particular to 
the EU and Asian market, and this development would undoubtedly be a game 
changer in the gas business.130 Furthermore, LNG imported by the U.S. prior to 
the shale revolution has also been freed up for sale to other major gas consumer 
countries. 
4. In light of recent developments, with its strong economy, political stability and 
proximity to major LNG consumer Asian countries, Australia is likely to play a 
profound role in the LNG business in the years ahead. 131 
5. Additionally, newly found enormous gas fields in West Africa, namely in 
Tanzania and Mozambique, have created euphoria for the region. These current 
developments have attributed to the gas glut that has resulted in lower gas 
prices. The fact that most of the contracts are inked on long-term- oil pegged –
inflexible terms, coupled with the historically low level of the oil price, has 
further pulled down the cost of LNG. It can be suggested that LNG is no longer 
considered a high-priced source of gas for many countries given the 
circumstances that have created the gas glut.132     
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Finally, it is prerequisite for Turkey to strengthen its gas storage capacity. Currently, 2.5 
bcm volume of gas in Silivri and 1.5 bcm of gas in Aksaray can be stored and this 
storage capacity is undoubtedly insufficient for a country that consumes 50 bcm of gas 
annually. In the short to medium term, at least 10 bcm of storage capacity should be 
targeted with the aim of securing gas in times of shortage as well as supporting gas-
demanding countries in case of gas supply disruption. 
/  
Israel: Becoming an Energy Power in the Region  
Figure 16: Gas Fields in Israel 
 
 Source: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
Israel, a neighbor with the potential to be a major source of gas supply in the years 
ahead in the East Mediterranean, has taken further steps towards mending fences with 
Turkey, which has resulted in a draft agreement for Turkey to buy gas from Israel. 
Commenting on the talks between Turkey and Israel, former U.S. Ambassador Matthew 
Bryza said, “Erdogan is sending a political signal in the form of an economic 
partnership with Israel to blunt any fears that Russia could cut off the gas 
supply”.133This view is worthy of consideration especially given the acrimonious split 
between Turkey and Russia which has led the way for Ankara to search for alternative 
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gas sources in case of gas supply disruption, with the aim of moving towards the goal of 
achieving diversification of gas supply sources.134 
Full restoration of ties between Turkey and Israel may take much longer than the period 
of time many experts anticipate, however, increasing energy ties would further 
strengthen the relationship. As Cagaptay states, “ a pipeline would be a huge deal, 
meaning that the next time the Turkish-Israeli relationship faces a political shock like in 
2010, that pipeline would keep them together, given its political, economic, and 
commercial ramifications”.135 Turkey would shore up its relationship with the U.S. and 
NATO counties in times of high tension arising from the ongoing Syrian war, and Israel 
would tighten its relationship with its Muslim neighbours, in particular Turkey, Jordan 
and Egypt. Moreover, “ Ankara has an interest now in showing the Russians it has other 
options to get natural gas” 136  as Cagaptay rightly puts it, and indeed, “earlier, 
diversifying energy supplies was a long-term need that Turkey had. With the crises with 
Russia, this has become a pressing need”.137 
The partnership of Edeltech and the Turkish Zorlu Enerji group, which have already 
become partners with the Dorah Energy plants in Israel, have agreed to buy 1.3 billion 
USD worth of gas for an eighteen year period, according to Reuters. This agreement can 
be interpreted as a signal of trust in Israel’s promising Leviathan and Tamar gas fields. 
It has been agreed that prices are pegged to the cost of electricity production.138 
Despite it appearing overly ambitious, an early estimate by the Israeli energy ministry, 
anticipated that, by 2023 onward, a volume of 6 bcm would likely be provided, on the 
assumption that political tensions are set aside and potential business plans are put in 
place.  
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Different scenarios are on the table regarding how Israel would be able to export gas to 
the EU market. Among the variety of potential projects, the most commercially viable 
and economically sound option would be to construct a shared liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) facility with Cyprus as well as an underwater pipeline to Turkey. This dual 
strategy would benefit Turkey, Israel and Cyprus 139  and would give the parties 
flexibility in transporting gas to a greater number destinations. The potential pipeline to 
Turkey would feed the EU market, while a LNG facility would provide liquid gas to the 
Far-Asian market. It is argued that onshore LNG terminal on Israeli land would be the 
first potential option, but given the physical security and potential environmental 
problems, this proposal has to be shelved and replaced with either a shared LNG facility 
with Cyprus or a floating LNG terminal off the Israeli cost.140 
At a conference in Ankara, the Foreign Ministry of Israel’s special energy envoy headed 
by Michael Lotem, clearly stated the position of Israel in an agreement with Turkey 
over a potential pipeline by saying, “Israel’s door is open to such [a] deal”.141 He further 
commented on the viability of potential projects by pointing out that “a pipeline to 
Turkey [is] low cost when you compare it to other options to export the gas to further 
flung destinations.”142 To show the sincere interest of Turkey to commit to further 
deepening ties with Israel in energy relations, former energy minister Taner Yıldız 
highlighted in 2013 that, “Turkey is interested in Israeli gas”.143 Once such a project 
comes online, Turkey’s heavy reliance on Russia as well as its dependence on Iran and 
Azerbaijan would be diminished as a percentage of overall supply, even if this is not 
initially to a significant degree. Such a concerted effort between Turkey and Israel 
would send a message to EU countries, specifically to Cyprus, that all parties would 
benefit in cooperating with Turkey. 
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By exporting gas either in the form of LNG or through pipelines, gas transportation 
between Turkey and Israel would transcend the commercial aspect of the project. If this 
project were to be realized, it would not only serve to strengthen the strategic 
partnership with Israel but also would help Turkey to diversify its overall gas portfolio 
and further increase the overall gas volume in the Turkish gas market. An estimated 
capacity of 6 bcm of natural gas coming from Israel, with a potential of increase 
afterward, would serve Turkey’s purpose in achieving the set target of becoming a 
genuine energy-trading hub in the region. Other than Turkey’s own gas consumption, 
gas supply surplus is needed both for enlarging its storage capacity as well as for the 
creation of a market that would serve to set natural gas pricing, a prerogative of the 
utmost importance for a trading hub. As “Israel is on the threshold of becoming a major 
energy power”144 in the region, recognizing the economic imperative of a pipeline in a 
very volatile region would serve as a catalyst for strategic partnership with game-
changing consequences. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TURKEY’S POTENTIAL FOR PROVIDING ENERGY SECURITY FOR THE 
EU GAS MARKET 
The stock of fossil fuels available for consumption as a primary resource to create 
energy is limited. For Europe in particular, managing scarce resources wisely is crucial 
since, as the second biggest economy in the world, Europe consumes one fifth of the 
world’s total energy. Considering the fact that Europe has insignificant amount of its 
own energy resources, the need for a sustainable and efficient as well as secure energy 
policy has become more vital for Europe. However, so far the European Union has been 
unable to create a common energy policy that solves the energy problem at various 
levels.  
As stated by Helm, “The EU has never had an explicit energy policy in the way that it 
has, for example, had an agricultural, industrial, or competition policy”.145 Having said 
that, in spite of its secondary position when compared with other important policies 
such as the common agricultural policy, energy has never really been off the European 
agenda  
After the Second World War, having established that energy resources had been a major 
factor in World War II, a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established 
with the Paris Treaty in 1951. Later on, the six founding member states of the ECSC 
signed an agreement in 1957 establishing the European Atomic Energy (EURATOM). 
Thus with the introduction of the very first European treaty, we see that Europe attached 
great importance to the energy issue. With the beginning of the 1973 oil crises, 
European countries collaboratively started to understand the importance of having a 
common energy policy and began seeking for alternative energy resources.  
The Council Resolution of 17 September 1974 concerning a new energy policy strategy 
for the Community stated its common will to create diversified energy resources, 
including nuclear energy, to meet increasing demand. The second aim was to find new 
ways to improve security of supply. With this resolution, it became evident that 
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community level energy integration in the realm of energy security was needed. Even 
though, the community level cooperation among the European states was projected in 
the resolution, energy was still perceived as a national sector. As stated by the European 
Commission (2012), the reason why Europe lacks a genuine energy market is because a 
“market of 500 million consumers has yet to become a reality, as the development of 
cross-border energy businesses is still being hampered by a raft of national rules.” 146In 
this regard, the constitutive element of a common European energy policy, which would 
strengthen the EU’s hand in securing energy supply, was hindered by strong opposition 
of various national governments. Hence, it would be appropriate to clarify what the 
boundaries of energy security are.  
Despite the fact that various energy security definitions exist, the International Energy 
Agency (IAE) defines it as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an 
affordable price” and divides that definition into parts. Firstly, the IEA states that “long-
term energy security mainly deals with timely investment to supply energy in line with 
economic developments and environmental needs”. When it comes to the more 
immediate term, the IEA states that “short-term energy security focuses on the ability of 
the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes in the supply-demand 
balance”.147 European Union needs to find alternatives so as to secure its energy supply.  
Despite the process of creating a common energy policy, the EU was slow until the 
1990’s. During these years, the importance of creating common EU energy policies 
have never been realized, which resulted in some fundamental changes in the way that 
Europe handled the energy policy with different approaches. Next, the major energy 
policies implemented in the EU will briefly examined in order to better grasp the key 
energy challenges for Europe. 
Energy Charter Treaty 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was signed in 1994 and the EU and its member 
states, in total 51 countries, were the signatories of the treaty excluding the USA and 
                                                
146 The European Union Explained, “Sustainable, Secure and Affordable Energy for Europeans”, EU Commission, 
2012 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/energy.pdf 
147 World Energy Outlook, International Energy Agency, P.24 
  65 
Canada. The Energy Charter Treaty aimed at establishing a multilateral framework for 
cross-border co-operations in the energy industry covering all aspects of commercial 
energy activities such as trade, transit, investments and energy efficiency. The charter 
Treaty established cooperation among the member states with a legally binding 
agreement. The treaty also aimed to promote the East-West cooperation in the field of 
industry and provide legal guarantees. The Treaty created a framework for an 
international cooperation among the industrialized countries and the EU countries with 
the purpose of supporting the Eastern European countries to reach to their potential. The 
treaty also promoted efficiency and sustainable development in the realm of energy.  
In the treaty, provisions in the field of sovereignty, transparency, competition, 
environment and taxation were set out. With sovereignty, member state countries can 
exercise their autonomy in accordance with the International law stating that flows of 
investments and technologies are mutually beneficial.  
In other words, each member country is free to decide whether and how its national 
energy resources are developed. The treaty also promotes transparency regarding the 
operations of energy products and materials. So, the contracting parties are required to 
nominate an inquiry to request an information law, decisions and law. In addition, the 
Treaty promoted the idea of competition so that all parties must involve in case if any 
market distortion occurs. The Treaty requires the contracting parties to reduce harmful 
environmental effects caused by energy use and therefore, the ‘polluter pays’ principle 
was put in place. According to the Treaty's provisions concerning taxation, direct 
taxation remains in the hands of national governments as long as it is agreed bilaterally. 
 
White Paper (1995): An Energy Policy for the European Union 
The case for a Community energy policy was first introduced by White paper in 1995. 
Even though the previous treaties provided roles at Community level in the field of 
energy, neither of them came up with a coherent policy. From its last experiences, the 
commission concluded that in order to have a harmonious energy policy within the 
Union, a sound and coherent energy policy needs to be introduced at Community level. 
Only with the implication of a coherent energy policy by the member states level and 
the community level, benefits can be maximized. Therefore, it is clearly indicated in the 
paper that an effective energy policy can only be achieved at Community level. 
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There are 3 main objectives defined by the White Paper and this was a five year 
working program defined by the Commission to be achieved; 
• overall competitiveness,  
• security of energy supply, 
• environmental protection.148 
Green Paper (2000): Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
Supply149 
The Green Paper was written based on the fact that the Europe’s incrementally 
increasing energy demand would increase its energy reliance from outside sources since 
the capacity of generation of energy of Europe is limited. As stated in the Green Paper 
(2000), unless necessary measures were taken by the EU, its energy dependence might 
increase in the next 20 or 30 years of time to the level of 70% of its total energy 
demand. This level of energy dependence, no doubt, will be felt in all the sectors of the 
economy. The amount of energy exported to the EU in 1999 was equal to 240 billion 
euro, which was equal to 6% of the total import of the Union.  
The Treaty on the European Union in the article 2 and 6 state that, a long-term strategy 
for energy supply and security needs ensure the following:  
• Energy products availability on the market should be uninterrupted, 
• Energy products should be affordable both for individuals and industry, 
• Environmental concerns should be respected, 
• Working towards sustainable development should be identified. 
INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation) 
INOGATE was introduced in 1995 as a technical energy cooperation program 
mechanism between European Union (EU), Eastern Europe, the Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. This project was particularly concerned with natural gas and oil pipelines that 
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were running from the Caucasus and Eastern Europe to the EU market. The program 
started in 1995 and expanded in 2004 with Baku Initiative framework and it has evolved 
with broader partnership in the realm of energy and concentrated in four key topics: 
• convergence of energy markets on the basis of EU principles, 
• enhancing energy security, 
• supporting sustainable energy development, 
• attracting investment towards energy projects of common and regional 
interest.150  
The vision of this energy cooperation program described by the INOGATE status report 
2011 and states that “Ultimately, INOGATE’s vision is to support the cooperation of 
the EU and the INOGATE Partner Countries to secure, clean, sustainable, adequate and 
reliable energy resources for their citizens at affordable prices”.151 
Energy 2020- A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy 
The Europeanization of energy policy is seen as a key to solving the European energy 
problem. Considering the rising energy prices in recent years and increasing 
dependence on particular sources jeopardize the whole European economy and its 
competitiveness in the world economy. Regarding the climate change issue, the 
challenges that the world facing today is immense and fighting against the climate 
change requires a solid and strong cooperation between nations. Additionally, it is 
stated by the Energy Commission that in the coming years, Europe will need one trillion 
Euro so as to repair its old energy infrastructure and install new capacities to cope with 
the rising energy demand. Therefore, in order to meet the challenges that the energy 
field poses today, the European Union has come up with the 2020 strategies. This 
ambitious and robust strategy aims at setting rules for the integrated European Energy 
Market. 
In 2007, the European Council adopted a very assertive and ambitious target for 2020, 
• Reducing greenhouse gas emission by 20% (compare to 1990 level), 
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• Increasing the renewable energy level in total energy consumption by 20%, 
• Improving the energy efficiency level by 20% in 2020. 
Energy 2020 strategy is based on five priorities; 
       “1. Achieving an energy-efficient Europe, 
         2. Building a truly pan-European integrated energy market, 
         3. Empowering consumers and achieving the highest level of safety and security, 
         4. Extending Europe’s leadership in energy technology and innovation, 
         5. Strengthening the external dimension of the EU energy Market”.152 
Once the above-mentioned targets are met by the year 2020, all the citizens of the EU 
will benefit from mode affordable, secure energy with a low level of green house gas 
emission. Moreover, the creation of alternative sources of energy and investment in 
technological innovation in energy field will enhance the EU’s hand in coping with its 
energy challenges.  
Green Paper COM (2006): A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy 
The Green Paper plays a fundamental role in creating an energy policy for the EU. It is 
well known that in order to achieve economic, environmental as well as social goals, 
energy challenges need to be overcome. Hence, the paper focuses on three major 
objectives: 
• Sustainability;  reducing greenhouse gas emission and introducing renewable 
energy to increase efficiency 
• Security of supply; managing demand and supply of energy needs of the Union 
• Competitiveness; creating an integrated market that would provide affordable 
energy prices for consumers of the Union. 153 
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This Green Paper has been perceived as a landmark improvement for Europe in 
advancing its common energy policy by gathering a disparate energy policy into a form 
that would shape incoming energy policies. 
The Green Paper puts forward suggestions and options that could form the basis for the 
shape and direction of the EU’s future energy policy. This document was important in 
identifying the major characteristics of the EU’s energy outlook and the projected 
changes. 
The Energy Security Challenges Faced by the EU and Turkey 
As one of the world’s major energy consumers, the European Union encounters certain 
challenges in securing its energy demand. The EU’s main challenges of security of 
supply can be named as the following: 
• rapid increase in energy demand,  
• energy resources competition,  
• political instability of energy producing countries,  
• fragmented energy market within the EU, 
• green house gas emissions. 154 
Should these main energy challenges described above be solved, it would guarantee the 
security of Europe’s energy supply. However, as long as the energy security issues were 
approached at a national level rather than the EU level, the ultimate goals of the energy 
security strategy could not be realized. In this regard, the failure to speak with one voice 
at the EU level would undermine any strategies pursued by the Union.  
When it comes to the Turkey’s energy supply challenges, the country faces many of the 
same challenges as the EU. However, there are some specific differences facing Turkey. 
Like Europe, it has a high dependency on imported energy resources but it also faces 
problems with: 
• trustworthiness of energy suppliers, and  
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• energy sector investment and renovation of infrastructure.155 
Despite differences, once the challenges of a rapidly increasing energy demand and 
higher energy dependency on fossil fuels are taken into consideration, we can see that 
Turkey and the EU face similar difficulties. The European Commission’s ‘European 
Energy Security Strategy’ paper (2014) states that EU imports meet 53.8 % of its total 
energy demand (see table 1). In terms of crude oil, EU imports reach 90% of the total 
usage, whereas its dependency in natural gas is about 66%. Solid and nuclear fuel 
imports are 42% and 40% respectively as of 2013. Given these percentages of the 
primary energy sources, the EU’s heavy dependency on imports puts its energy supply 
security at risk and makes it vulnerable to the external shocks. This is particularly valid 
for Eastern Europe and the Baltic region.  
 
 
Figure 17: Energy Dependence Rate in the EU 
 
Another joint challenge that Turkey and the EU face is the fact that their energy 
infrastructure faces obsolescence and needs to be renovated. Further, both Turkey and 
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the EU need new energy investment in order to increase their storage capacity level so 
as to cope in the event of any energy shortages. As Balat (2010) puts it, “Turkey needs 
to spend $128 billion on energy investment by the end of the 2020, including $91 
billion on new power generation facilities, to keep pace with its rapid growth 
economy”.156  Similarly, the Energy Commission states that in the coming years Europe 
would need one trillion euro so as to repair its old energy infrastructure and install new 
capacities to cope with the rising energy demand. In order to meet the challenges that 
the energy field poses today, the European Union and Turkey need to come up with 
ambitious and robust strategies. 
 
Figure 18: Gas Flows to Europe 
 
Source: International Energy Agency  
Overall, the EU came a long way towards creating a common energy policy but it still 
remains fragmented due to the Member State divisions on different economic and 
political interest. However, the creations of internal energy market, combating with 
climate change and the security of energy supply have become a common energy policy 
that all the Member States have agreed upon. Additionally, the liberalization of energy 
market as well as improving the energy grids and infrastructure have also become the 
priority within the Member States in order to increase the competitiveness, which would 
reduce the energy bills of an ordinary European citizen.  
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It is only through integrated and common energy policy pursued by the EU that these 
formidable challenges can be achieved. The renovation of obsolete energy systems, 
innovation on energy technology and the generation of energy through renewable 
system require tremendous financial allocations. Hence, without the European 
cooperation, public funds cannot be channeled towards achieving these goals. In this 
regard, from White Paper to Green Paper and from Energy and Climate goals for 2030 
to Energy Roadmap 2050, the EU has taken a step forward in achieving greater 
coordination and collaboration among the Member States. It became evident that 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy can only be guaranteed through a genuine 
common European energy policy. Therefore, the solution lies in the hands of the 
Member States to pursue a coherent European energy policy.  
As a result of economic expansion, social growth and enlargement, the EU’s energy 
demand has risen steadily in the last two decades. Given the fact that the EU Member 
States have limited energy resources as well as noting that, as of 2013, 90% of crude oil 
and 66% of natural gas was imported, the security of energy supply emerges as a main 
challenge for the EU. In this respect the diversification of its energy sources and routes, 
energy saving and increasing the percentages of renewable energy in total energy 
consumption have been suggested as solutions to meet the security of energy supply 
challenges. Energy saving and renewable energy sources are related to internal energy 
market in the EU; however, diversification of its external energy sources, suppliers and 
supply routes must also be tackled. In this regard, Turkey provides alternative routes to 
the EU’s energy market to meet the demand of its energy needs. We have seen that 
crude oil pipelines such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Kirkuk-Yumurtalık and natural 
gas pipelines such as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), the Blue Stream and the ongoing 
Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) project may to be alternative sources in securing the 
energy needs of the EU. As a result, Turkey may play an important role in securing 
energy for the European market via diversification; nevertheless, Turkey is not an 
indispensable partner for Europe. As long as Turkey’s dependency on Russian gas 
increases, which is the current case, and as long as the volume of natural gas and crude 
oil that is carried through the country to Europe do not meet the European energy 
demand, Turkey’s ability to act as security for the EU’s energy market will remain low. 
Additionally, a fragmented energy market as well as different economic and 
geostrategic approaches of the member states currently prevents the EU from pursuing a 
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common energy policy, which would strengthen the European hand in the world energy 
market. For these reasons, Turkey as an energy transit country does not seem to be 
irreplaceable partner in securing the energy supply for the EU.  
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has addressed the question of whether Turkey can fulfil its potential as a 
provider of energy security for Europe by investigating major oil and gas pipelines to 
which Turkey is connected, or benefitting; utilized a framework for the definition of an 
energy trading hub to clarify ambiguities between definitions for an energy hub as 
opposed to an energy bridge or corridor, and the prerequisites for meeting the definition 
were discussed. The shortcomings or impediments to Turkey’s aspirations were 
explored, and recommendations put forward. Additionally projections were made 
concerning the potential energy export countries which would increase Turkey’s overall 
spare capacity, upon which Turkey could improve its status as a potential energy trading 
hub. Finally, the question of whether Turkey could serve as a key player in securing the 
EU’s energy security was considered, and the conclusion drawn that, given the major 
obstacles elaborated upon in the second chapter, unless these are solved, Turkey would 
remain an energy bridge or corridor rather than advance to the status of energy hub.  
Current tensions between Russia- Ukraine, the continuing tensions in the Middle East 
and the sanctions imposed on Iran by the West mean that Turkey, as one of the better 
performing economies in the region, is in many respects well positioned as a country 
able to provide a secure energy supply. Neither Turkey and Europe nor other countries 
that consume Middle Eastern or Caspian energy sources expect to see any serious 
regional threat to the security of energy supply. Therefore, Turkey has emerged as a 
strategic player in the regional energy market due to its relatively stable economic and 
political position. However, while Turkey may play a significant role in the region as a 
transit state, its chances of becoming a genuine energy hub remain limited due to the 
reasons outlined above. Turkey’s position as an energy corridor means that in energy 
negotiations it remains a ‘price-taking’ rather than a ‘price-setting’ country, determining 
neither the prices charged nor quantities granted for energy importing countries. 
Turkey’s successful advancement to the status of gas hub can only be realized with 
transparency, broad liquidity and flexibility, a deregulated gas market created on the 
premise of political will and market culture, and the provision of non-discriminatory 
access to gas storage as well as to multiple gas supplies with the help of larger financial 
players. The attraction of foreign direct investment in the energy sector in Turkey is 
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handicapped by Turkey’s policy not to liberalize its gas market, which can be 
considered another hindrance to becoming a fully price-competitive country. 
As long as Turkey fails to reduce its dependency on Russian natural gas, liberalize its 
natural gas market, build better storage facilities and increase its funding for building 
transfer units, its hopes of becoming a physical energy hub country will not be realized. 
Indeed, the fulfillment of these requirements will still not secure the conditions for the 
country to become an energy hub; without hub status Turkey will remain unable to 
influence energy prices and its role in EU energy security will remain relatively minor. 
Many of the pressing challenges that stand in the way of Turkey becoming a genuine 
energy hub in the region can be overcome provided that the following requirements are 
fulfilled. Firstly, the weight of gas-to-gas competition should be internalized; secondly, 
a transition towards flexible and dynamic markets contracts varying from short-term to 
spots and hub pricing should be integrated and supported with a new legal and 
regulatory framework; and thirdly, a greater volume of liquefied natural gas should be 
utilized and integrated into the system to balance the risks associated with pipeline-
based gas. 
The main motive for Turkey should not be solely based upon security of energy supply 
but should also aim to increase the volume of gas stored in the country as well as work 
towards its main goal of becoming an energy trading hub by creating a portfolio created 
with an additional spare capacity that includes as many sources as are available. 
Regarding the question of whether Turkey would be able to create a spare capacity to 
offer as an alternative option for the EU gas market, based on current discoveries and 
potential improvements, the projection made in chapter three suggests that about twenty 
five to thirty bcm of gas could be available by around 2030 with the assumption that the 
undergoing TANAP project becomes operational; Cyprus and Israel find common 
ground and construct a seabed pipeline connecting Turkey; the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) comes to a final agreement with the central government over 
control of oil in the KRG region; and lastly that the overall LNG capacity in Turkey 
increases to a level that can balance pipeline-based gas in the long run. Once an extra 
volume of twenty five to thirty bcm of gas has become available with the support of 
well-established storage facilities, Turkey’s current energy corridor position would 
likely be elevated. 
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 Although numerous conditions for achieving the requirements of an energy hub have 
been described in detail, the underlying reasons why Turkey should be endeavouring to 
fulfil these need to be further clarified. Firstly, being a genuine energy hub would help 
Turkey to become more influential in its surrounding region. Secondly, Turkey’s 
international standing in the world arena will be enhanced and this would strengthen 
Turkey’s credentials for not only being an economic and military power but also a key 
regional state contributing to the region’s overall energy security. Turkey would also be 
in a better position to decide which role it would ultimately play in regional energy 
geopolitics. To this end, it has a significant potential role in a) offering the EU 
additional energy security, by offering a gas surplus, with storage capacity that can be 
utilized during peak or crisis periods; b) offering through gas-to-gas competition, with 
its liberalized market, benefits to end-users as well as potentially opening up a new gas 
market where new-comers can offer competitive pricing; and c) offering those EU gas 
consumers with a heavy dependence on Russian supplies the possibility of relief from 
the perceived political leverage created by Russia’s supremacy in the market. Only once 
it has secured the position in the region that connects East and West as well as North 
and South, and having become a genuine energy hub in the region, could Turkey’s long 
journey to accession to the EU be facilitated. The current stalemate between Turkey and 
the EU looks set to continue on its now half-century long journey of mutual distrust, 
and any improvement in the prospects for success remain to be seen.   
Among all other impediments to Turkey’s ambition, the regulatory environment is the 
most significant. To take advantage of its unique geographic position and establish itself 
a natural gas hub in the region, Turkey needs to take measures to improve its status, 
moving away from its status as an energy transit corridor and towards that of an energy 
hub. Once the long-planned liberalization of the Turkish gas market is implemented, in 
line with the development of free pricing and gas-to-gas competition, many more 
private companies would be able to contribute to the increase of gas volume to surplus 
levels, similar to that of Baumgarten. 
Therefore, a major overhaul in the field of regulation needs to be implemented, starting 
with the lowering of BOTAŞ’ approximately eighty percent market share. It should also 
be noted that the gas market can only be liberalized and became transparent and 
competitive when BOTAŞ is unbundled into the four bodies elaborated upon in chapter 
2. 
  77 
A second area in which Turkey needs to work toward change is the improvement of gas 
storage and other physical infrastructure, such as pipeline networking. With the 
consumption of approximately 50 bcm of gas in 2015 in Turkey, the currently 
operational gas storage facilities in Turkey are inadequate, nowhere near meeting the 
demands of its own potential peak needs. Besides the problem of inadequate storage 
capacity, price fluctuations as well as changes in seasonal demand have also put a strain 
on Turkey to the extent that the construction of additional gas pipelines has become one 
of the prerequisites for meeting these and other similarly unpredictable circumstances. 
A third hindrance is the nature of the conventional natural gas agreement itself. As long 
as Turkey practices the inflexible long-term, oil-pegged, and take-or-pay contracts, with 
the many complications they bring, the gas hub requirement of being “a place where 
energy is bought and sold”157 will not be realized.  
These obstacles should be interpreted to mean that progress towards becoming a liquid 
trading hub is still a distant goal for Turkey. If Turkey wishes to take full advantage of 
its potential, it would clearly need to be more conscientious in addressing its 
shortcomings.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
157 Roberts, J., “Turkey as a Regional Energy Hub”, Insight Turkey, 2010, P. 41 
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